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Abstract
Differential privacy is a cryptographically-motivated approach to privacy that has
become a very active field of research over the last decade in theoretical computer
science and machine learning. In this paradigm one assumes there is a trusted curator
who holds the data of individuals in a database and the goal of privacy is to simultane-
ously protect individual data while allowing the release of global characteristics of the
database. In this setting we introduce a general framework for parametric inference
with differential privacy guarantees. We first obtain differentially private estimators
based on bounded influence M-estimators by leveraging their gross-error sensitivity in
the calibration of a noise term added to them in order to ensure privacy. We then
show how a similar construction can also be applied to construct differentially private
test statistics analogous to the Wald, score and likelihood ratio tests. We provide
statistical guarantees for all our proposals via an asymptotic analysis. An interest-
ing consequence of our results is to further clarify the connection between differential
privacy and robust statistics. In particular, we demonstrate that differential privacy
is a weaker stability requirement than infinitesimal robustness, and show that robust
M-estimators can be easily randomized in order to guarantee both differential privacy
and robustness towards the presence of contaminated data. We illustrate our results
both on simulated and real data.
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1 Introduction
Differential privacy is a cryptographically-motivated approach to privacy which has become a
very active field of research over the last decade in theoretical computer science and machine
learning (Dwork and Roth, 2014). In this paradigm one assumes there is a trusted curator
who holds the data of individuals in a database that might for instance be constituted by n
individual rows. The goal of privacy is to simultaneously protect every individual row while
releasing global characteristics of the database. Differential privacy provides such guarantees
in the context of remote access query systems where the data analysts do not get to see the
actual data, but can ask a server for the output of some statistical model. Here the trusted
curator processes the queries of the user and releases noisy versions of the desired output in
order to protect individual level data.
The interest in remote access systems was prompted by the recognition of fundamental
failures of anonymization approaches. Indeed, it is now well acknowledged that releasing
data sets without obvious individual identifiers such as names and home addresses are not
sufficient to preserve privacy. The problem with such approaches is that an ill-intentioned
user might be able to link the anonymized data with external non anonymous data. Hence
auxiliary information could help intruders break anonymization and learn sensitive informa-
tion. One prominent example of privacy breach is the de-anonymization of a Massachusetts
hospital discharge database by joining it with with a public voter database in Sweeney (1997).
In fact combining anonymization with sanitization techniques such as adding noise to the
dataset directly or removing certain entries of the data matrix are also fundamentally flawed
(Narayanan and Smatikov, 2008). On the other hand, differential privacy provides a rigorous
mathematical framework to the notion of privacy by guaranteeing protection against identity
attacks regardless of the auxiliary information that may be available to the attackers. This
is achieved by requiring that the output of a query does not change too much if we add or
remove any individual from the data set. Therefore the user cannot learn much about any
individual data record from the output requested.
There is now a large body of literature in this topic and recent work has sought to
link differential privacy to statistical problems by developing privacy-preserving algorithms
for empirical risk minimization, point estimation and density estimation (Dwork and Lei,
2009; Wasserman and Zhou, 2010; Smith, 2011; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Bassily et al., 2014).
Despite the numerous developments made in the area of differential privacy since the seminal
work of Dwork et al. (2006), one can argue that their practical utility in applied scientific work
is very limited by the lack of broad guidelines for statistical inference. In particular, there
are no generic procedures for performing statistical hypothesis testing for general parametric
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models which arguably constitutes one of the cornerstones of a statisticians data analysis
toolbox.
1.1 Our contribution
The basic idea of our work is to introduce differentially private algorithms leveraging tools
from robust statistics. In particular, we use the Gaussian mechanism studied in the differen-
tial privacy literature in combination with robust statistics sensitivity measures. At a high
level, this mechanism provides a generic way to release a noisy version of a statistical query,
where the noise level is carefully calibrated to ensure privacy. For this purpose, appropri-
ate notions of sensitivity have been studied in the computer science literature. By focusing
on the class of parametric M-estimators, we show that the well studied statistics notion of
sensitivity given by the influence function can also be used to calibrate the Gaussian mech-
anism. This logic extends to tests derived from M-estimators since their sensitivity can also
be understood via the influence function.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first one to provide a systematic treatment
of estimation and hypothesis testing with differential privacy guarantees in the context of
general parametric models. The main contributions of this paper are the following:
(a) We introduce a general class of differentially private parametric estimators under mild
conditions. Our estimators are computationally efficient and can be tuned to trade-off
statistical efficiency and robustness.
(b) We propose differentially private counterparts of the Wald, score and likelihood ratio
tests for parametric models. Our proposals are by construction robust in a contami-
nation neighborhood of the assumed generative model and are easily constructed from
readily available statistics.
(c) We further clarify the connections between differential privacy and robust statistics
by showing that the influence function can be used to bound the smooth sensitivity of
Nissim et al. (2007). It follows that bounded-influence estimators can naturally be used
to construct differentially private estimators. The converse is not true as our analysis
shows that one can construct differentially private estimators that asymptotically do
not have a bounded influence function.
1.2 Related work
The notion of differential privacy is very similar to the intuitive one of robustness in statistics.
The latter requires that no small portion of the data should influence too much a statistical
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analysis (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009; Hampel et al., 1986; Belsley et al., 2005; Maronna et al.,
2006). This connection has been noticed in previous works that have shown how to construct
differentially private robust estimators. In particular, the estimators of (Dwork and Lei,
2009; Smith, 2011; Lei, 2011; Chaudhuri and Hsu, 2012) are the most closely related to ours
since they all provide differentially private parametric estimators building on M-estimators
and establish statistical convergence rates. However, our construction compares favorably
to previous proposals in many regards. Our estimators preserve the optimal parametric√
n-consistency, and hence our privacy guarantees do not come at the expense of slower
statistical rates of convergence as in (Dwork and Lei, 2009; Lei, 2011). Furthermore we do
not assume a known diameter of the parameter space as in Smith (2011). Our construction
is inspired by the univariate estimator of Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012) which is in general
computationally inefficient as it requires the computation of the smooth sensitivity defined
in Section 2.2. We broaden the scope of their technique to general multivariate M-estimators
and more importantly, we overcome the computational barrier intrinsic to their method by
showing that the empirical influence function can be used in the noise calibration of the
Gaussian mechanism. There are however other possible approaches to construct differentially
private estimators. Here we discuss three popular alternatives that have been explored in
the literature.
The first approach seeks to design a mechanism to release differentially private data in-
stead of constructing new estimators. This can be achieved by constructing a differentially
private density estimator such as a perturbed histogram of the data. Once such a density
estimator is available it can be used to either sample private data (Wasserman and Zhou,
2010) or to construct a weighted differentially private objective function for empirical risk
minimization (Lei, 2011). Although the latter approach leads to better rates of conver-
gence for parametric estimation, they remain slow and have a bad dimension dependence
max{1/√n, (√log n/n)2/(2+p)}, where n is the sample size and p is the dimension of the
estimated parameter. Indeed, this approach suffers from the curse of dimensionality since
it relies on the computation of multivariate density estimators. Interestingly, a somehow
related approach for releasing synthetic data existed in the statistics literature prior to the
advent of differential privacy (Rubin, 1993; Reiter, 2002, 2005) and consequently also lacks
formal theoretical privacy guarantees.
A second approach consist of releasing estimators that are defined as the minimizers of a
perturbed objective function. Representative work in this direction includes Chaudhuri and
Monteleoni (2008) in the context of penalized logistic regression, Chaudhuri et al. (2011)
in the general learning problem of empirical risk minimization and Kiefer et al. (2012) in a
high dimensional regression setting. A related idea to perturbing the objective function is
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to is to run a stochastic gradient descent algorithm where at each iteration update step an
appropriately scaled noise term is added to the gradient in order to ensure privacy. This idea
was used for example by Rajkumar and Argawal (2012) in the context of multiparty classi-
fication, Bassily et al. (2014) in the general learning setting of empirical risk minimization
and Wang et al. (2015) for Bayesian learning. Although the potential applicability of these
two perturbation approaches to a wide variety of models makes them appealing, it remains
unclear how to construct test statistics in these settings.
A third alternative approach is to draw samples from a well suited probability distribu-
tion. The exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar (2007) is a main example of a
general method for achieving (ε, 0)-differential privacy via random sampling. This idea leads
naturally to connections with posterior sampling in Bayesian statistics. Some papers explor-
ing these ideas include Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012) and Dimitrakakis et al. (2014, 2017). See
also Foulds et al. (2016) for a broader discussion of different mechanism for constructing pri-
vacy preserving Bayesian methods. Bayesian approaches that provide differentially private
posterior distributions seem to be naturally amenable for the construction of confidence in-
tervals and test statistics, as explored in Liu (2016). However it does not seem obvious to us
how to use Bayesian privacy preserving results such Dimitrakakis et al. (2014, 2017); Foulds
et al. (2016) in order to provide analogue constructions to ours for estimation and testing.
Interestingly, in this line of work the typical regularity conditions required on the likelihood
and prior distribution are reminiscent of the regularity conditions required in frequentists
setups as discussed below in Section 3.1.
The literature on hypothesis testing with differential privacy guarantees is much more
recent and limited than the one focusing on estimation. A few papers tackling this problem
are the work of (Uhler et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Gaboardi et al., 2016) who consider dif-
ferentially private chi-squared tests and (Sheffet, 2017; Barrientos et al., 2019) who provide
differentially private t-tests for the regression coefficients of a linear regression model. Our
approach is more broadly applicable since it extends to general parametric models and also
weakens the distributional assumptions required by existing differentially private estimation
and testing techniques. Roughly speaking, this is due to the fact that our M-estimators are
robust by construction and will therefore have an associated bounded influence function. It
is worth noting that the latter property automatically guarantees gradient Lipschitz condi-
tions that have previously been assumed for differentially private empirical risk minimizers
(Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Bassily et al., 2014). After submitting the first version of this paper,
we have noticed some interesting new developments on differentially private inference in the
work of (Awan and Slavkovic, 2018, 2019; Canonne et al., 2019a,b).
One interesting new development in the literature that we do not cover in this work
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is local differential privacy. This new paradigm accounts for settings in which even the
statistician collecting the data is not trusted (Duchi et al., 2018). This scenario leads to slower
minimax optimal convergence rates of estimation for many important problems including
mean estimation and logistic regression. Sheffet (2018) seems to be the first work exploring
the problem of hypothesis testing under local differential privacy.
1.3 Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we overview some key background notions from differential privacy and robust
statistics that we use throughout the paper. In Section 3 we introduce our technique for con-
structing differentially private estimators and study their theoretical properties. In Section
4 we show how to further extend our construction to test functionals in order to perform
differentially private hypothesis testing using M-estimators. In Section 5 we illustrate the
numerical performance of our methods in both synthetic and real data. We conclude our pa-
per in Section 6 with a discussion of our results and future research directions. We relegated
to the Appendix all the proofs and some auxiliary results and discussions.
Notation: ‖V ‖ denotes either euclidean norm if V ∈ RN or its induced operator norm if
V ∈ RN×N . The smallest and largest eigenvalues of a matrix A are denoted by λmin(A) and
λmax(A). For two probability measures P and Q, the notation d∞(P,Q) and dTV (P,Q) stand
for sup-norm (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) and total variation distance. We reserve calligraphic
letters such as S for sets and denote their cardinality by |S|. For two sets of S and S ′ of the
same size, we denote their Hamming distance by dH(S,S ′) := |S \ S ′| = |S ′ \ S|.
2 Preliminaries
Let us first review some important background concepts from differential privacy, robust
statistics and the M-estimation framework for parametric models.
2.1 Differential privacy
Consider a database consisting of a set of data points D = {x1, . . . , xn} ∈ Xn, where X ⊂ Rm
is some data space. We also use the notation D(Fn) to emphasize that D can be viewed as
a data set associated with an empirical distribution Fn induced by {x1, . . . , xn}. Differential
privacy seeks to release useful information from the data set while protecting information
about any individual data entry.
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Definition 1. A randomized function A(D) is (ε, δ)–differentially private if for all pairs of
databases (D,D′) with dH(D,D′) = 1 and all measurable subsets of outputs O:
P(A(D) ∈ O) ≤ eεP(A(D′) ∈ O) + δ.
Intuitively, (ε, 0)-differential privacy ensures that for every run of algorithm A the output
is almost equally likely to be observed on every neighboring database. This condition is
relaxed by (ε, δ)-differential privacy since it allows that given a random output O drawn
from A(D), it may be possible to find a database D′ such that O is more likely to be
produced on D′ that it is when the database is D. However such an event will be extremely
unlikely. In both cases the similarity is defined by the factor eε while the probability of
deviating from this similarity is δ.
The magnitude of the privacy parameters (ε, δ) are typically considered to be quite differ-
ent. We are particularly interested in negligible values of δ that are smaller than the inverse
of any polynomial in the size n of the database. The rational behind this requirement is that
values of δ of the order of ‖x‖1, for some vector values database x, are problematic since
they “preserve privacy” while allowing to publish the complete records of a small number of
individuals in the database. On the other hand, the privacy parameter ε is typically thought
of as a moderately small constant and in fact “the nature of privacy guarantees with differing
but small epsilons are quite similar” (Dwork and Roth, 2014, p.25). Indeed, failing to be
(ε, 0)-differentially private for some large ε (i.e. ε = 10) is just saying that there is a least a
pair of neighboring datasets and an output O for which the ratio of probabilities of observing
O conditioned on the database being D or D′ is large.
One can naturally wonder how to compare two differentially private algorithms A1 and A2
with different associated privacy parameters (1, δ2) and (2, δ2). It seems natural to prefer
the algorithm that ensures the smallest privacy loss incurred by observing some output i.e.
log
(
P(A(D) ∈ O)/P(A(D′) ∈ O)). Since we only consider negligible δ1 and δ2, the privacy
loss will be approximately proportional to the privacy parameter ε. One could consequently
prefer the algorithm with the smallest parameter ε even though we say that roughly speaking
“all small epsilons are alike” (Dwork and Roth, 2014, p.24).
Differential privacy enjoys certain appealing properties that facilitates the design and
analysis of complicated algorithms with privacy guarantees. Perhaps the two most important
ones are that (ε, δ)-differential privacy is immune to post-processing and that combining two
differentially private algorithms preserves differential privacy. More precisely, if A is (ε, δ)-
differentially private, then the composition of any data independent mapping f with A is
also (ε, δ)-differentially private. In other words, releasing f(A(D)) for any D still guarantees
(ε, δ)-differential privacy. Furthermore, if we have two algorithms A1 and A2 with different
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associated privacy parameters (1, δ2)- and (2, δ2), then releasing the outputs of A1(D) and
A2(D) guarantees (ε1 +ε2, δ1 +δ2)-differential privacy. We refer interested readers to (Dwork
and Roth, 2014, Chapters 2–3) for a more extensive discussion of the concepts presented in
this subsection.
2.2 Constructing differentially private algorithms
A general and very popular technique for constructing differentially private algorithms is the
Laplace mechanism, which consists of adding some well calibrated noise to the output of a
standard query (Dwork et al., 2006). This procedure relies on suitable notions of sensitivity
of the function that is queried. All the following definitions of sensitivity are standard in the
differential privacy literature and are typically defined with respect to the L1 norm. We will
instead use the Euclidean norm for the construction of our estimators as explained below.
Definition 2. The global sensitivity of a function ϕ : Xn → Rp is
GS(ϕ) := sup
D,D′
{
‖ϕ(D)− ϕ(D′)‖ : dH(D,D′) = 1
}
.
The local sensitivity of a function ϕ : Xn → Rp at a data set D ∈ Xn is
LS(ϕ,D) := sup
D′
{
‖ϕ(D)− ϕ(D′)‖ : dH(D,D′) = 1
}
.
For ξ > 0, the ξ–smooth sensitivity of ϕ at D is
SSξ(ϕ,D) := sup
D′
{
e−ξdH(D,D
′)LS(ϕ,D′) : D′ ∈ Xn
}
.
We are now ready to describe two versions of the Laplace mechanism using the above
sensitivity notions defined with respect to the L1 norm. Denote by Lap(b) a scaled symmetric
Laplace distribution with density function hb(x) =
1
2b
exp(− |x|
b
) and let Lapp(b) be the mul-
tivariate distribution obtained from p independent and identically distributed Xj ∼ Lap(b)
for j = 1, . . . , p. A key idea introduced in the seminal paper Dwork et al. (2006) is that
for a function f : Xn → Rp and an input database D, one can simply compute f(D) and
then generate an independent noise term U ∼ Lapp(GS(f)/ε) in order to construct a (ε, 0)-
differentially private output f(D) + U . A related idea introduced by Nissim et al. (2007)
is to calibrate the noise using the smooth sensitivity instead of the local sensitivity. These
authors showed that provided ξ = ε
4(p+2 log(2/δ))
and U˜ ∼ Lapp(SSξ(f)/ε), then the output
f(D) + U˜ is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Our proposals will build on the latter idea for the
construction of private estimation and inferential procedures for parametric models.
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We would like to point out that the different notions of sensitivity introduced in Definition
2 are usually defined with respect to the L1 norm. We chose to instead present these
definitions in terms of the Euclidean distance as they are more naturally connected to well
studied concepts in robust statistics. In particular, it leads to connections with the standard
way of presenting the notion of gross-error sensitivity in robust statistics and the related
problem of optimal B-robust estimation (Hampel et al., 1986, Chapter 4). Because we
focus on sensitivities with respective to the Euclidean metric, our construction follows the
same logic of the Laplace mechanism, but naturally replaces the noise distribution with
an appropriately scaled normal random variable as proposed in Nissim et al. (2007). In
this case the output f(D) + U˜ is (ε, δ)-differentially private if U˜ ∼ Np(0, σ2I) where σ =
5
√
2 log(2/δ)SSξ(f)/ε and ξ =
ε
4(p+2 log(2/δ))
. For obvious reasons the resulting procedure has
been called the Gaussian mechanism in Dwork and Roth (2014). As we were completing the
revision of the current manuscript we noticed that Cai et al. (2019) have also worked with
this mechanism for the derivation of the optimal statistical minimax rates of convergence for
parametric estimation under (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
2.3 Robust statistics
Robust statistics provides a theoretical framework that allows to take into account that
models are only idealized approximations of reality and develops methods that give results
that are stable when slight deviations from the stochastic assumptions of the model occur.
Book-length expositions on the topic include (Huber, 1981; Huber and Ronchetti, 2009;
Hampel et al., 1986; Maronna et al., 2006). We will focus on the infinitesimal robustness
approach that considers the impact of moderate distributional deviations from ideal models
on a statistical procedure (Hampel et al., 1986). In this setting the statistics of interest are
viewed as functionals of the underlying distribution and the influence function is the key
tool used to assess the robustness of a statistical functional.
Definition 3. Given a measurable space Z, a distribution space F, a parameter space Θ ⊂ Rp
and a functional T : F 7→ Θ, the influence function of T at a point z ∈ Z for a distribution
F is defined as
IF(z;T, F ) := lim
t→0+
T (Ft)− T (F )
t
,
where Ft = (1− t)F + t∆z and ∆z is a mass point at z.
The influence function has the heuristic interpretation of describing the effect of an
infinitesimal contamination at the point z on the estimate, standardized by the mass of
contamination. Furthermore, if a statistical functional T (F ) is sufficiently regular, a von
9
Mises expansion (von Mises, 1947; Hampel, 1974; Hampel et al., 1986) yields
T (G) = T (F ) +
∫
IF(z;T, F )d(G− F )(z) + o(d∞(G,F )). (1)
Considering the approximation (1) over a neighborhood of the form Ft = {F (t)|F (t) = (1 −
t)F + tG, G an arbitrary distribution}, we see that the influence function can be used to
linearize the asymptotic bias in a neighborhood of the idealized model F . Therefore, a
statistical functional with bounded influence function is robust in the sense that it will have
a bounded approximate bias in a neighborhood of F . A related notion of robustness is the
gross-error sensitivity which measures the worst case value of the influence function.
Definition 4. The gross-error sensitivity of a functional T : F→ Θ at the distribution F is
γ(T, F ) := sup
x∈X
‖IF(x;T, F )‖.
Clearly if the space X is unbounded, the gross-error sensitivity of T will be infinite unless
its influence function is uniformly bounded. In Sections 3 and 4 we will show how to use the
robust statistics tools described here in the construction of differentially private estimators
and tests.
2.4 M-estimators for parametric models
M-estimators are a simple class of estimators that is appealing from a robust statistics
perspective and constitute a very general approach to parametric inference (Huber, 1964;
Huber and Ronchetti, 2009). They will be the focus of the rest of this paper. An M-estimator
θ̂ = T (Fn) of θ0 ∈ Θ ⊂ Rp is defined as a solution to
n∑
i=1
Ψ(xi, T (Fn)) = 0,
where Ψ : Rm ×Θ→ Rp, x1, . . . , xn ∈ Rm are independent identically distributed according
to F and Fn denotes the empirical distribution function. This class of estimators is a strict
generalization of the class of regular maximum likelihood estimators. Assuming that T (F ) =
θ0 and some mild conditions (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009, Ch. 6), as n → ∞ they are
asymptotically normally distributed as
√
n(T (Fn)− θ0)→d N(0, V (T, F )),
where V (T, F ) = EF [IF(X;T, F )IF(X;T, F )T ] and EF [IF(X;T, F )] = 0. Furthermore, their
influence function is
IF(x;T, F ) =
(
M(T, F )
)−1
Ψ(x, T (F )), (2)
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where M(T, F ) = −EF [Ψ˙(X,T (F ))] = − ∂∂θEF [Ψ(X, θ)]
∣∣
θ=θ0
. Therefore M-estimators de-
fined by bounded functions Ψ are said to be infinitesimally robust since their influence
function is bounded and by (1) their asymptotic bias will also be bounded for small amounts
of contamination.
3 Differentially private estimation
3.1 Assumptions
In the following we allow Ψ to depend on n, but we do not stress it in the notation to make
it less cumbersome. Here are the main conditions required in our analysis:
Condition 1. The function Ψ(x, θ) is differentiable with respect to θ almost everywhere for
all x ∈ X, and we denote this derivative by Ψ˙(x, θ). Furthermore, for all θ ∈ Θ there exists
constants Kn, Ln > 0 such that
sup
x∈X
‖Ψ(x, θ)‖ ≤ Kn and sup
x∈X
‖Ψ˙(x, θ)‖ ≤ Ln.
Condition 2. The matrix MF = M(T, F ) = −EF [Ψ˙(X,T (F ))] is positive definite at the
generative distribution F = Fθ0 . Furthermore the space of data sets X
n is such that for
all empirical distributions Gn ∈ {G|D(G) ∈ Xn} with n ≥ N0 we have that 0 < b ≤
λmin(MGn) ≤ λmax(MGn) ≤ B <∞.
Condition 3. There exist r1 > 0, r2 > 0, r3 > 0, C1 and C2 > 0 such that
‖EFn [Ψ˙(X, θ)]− EGn [Ψ˙(X, θ)]‖ ≤ C1d∞(Fn, Gn) and
‖EFn [Ψ˙(X, θ)]− EFn [Ψ˙(X,T (Fn))]‖ ≤ C2‖T (Fn)− θ‖
whenever d∞(Fn, Gn) ≤ r1, ‖θ − T (Fn)‖ ≤ r2 and ‖θ − θ0‖ ≤ r3.
Condition 1 requires Ψ and Ψ˙ to be uniformly bounded in X by some potentially di-
verging constants Kn and Ln. The case Kn = K < ∞ is particularly appealing from a
robust statistics perspective as it guarantees that the resulting M-estimators has a bounded
influence function. If additionally Ln = L < ∞, then the resulting M-estimator will also
be second order infinitesimally robust as defined in La Vecchia et al. (2012) and will have
a bounded change of variance function; see Hampel et al. (1981) and our Appendix C for
more details. Condition 2 restricts the space of data sets to one where some minimal reg-
ularity conditions on the Jacobian of Ψ hold. Similar assumptions are usually required to
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guarantee the asymptotic normality and Fre´chet differentiability of M-estimators, see for
example Huber (1967), (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009, Corollary 6.7) and Clarke (1986). Our
assumptions are stronger in order to guarantee that MGn is invertible and hence that the
empirical influence function is computable. Even though such requirements are not always
explicitly stated, common statistical practice implicitly assumes them when computing es-
timated asymptotic variances with plug-in formulas. In a standard linear regression setting
these conditions boil down to assuming that the design matrix is full rank. Even such a
seemingly harmless condition seems stronger in the differential privacy context. Indeed, it
might not be checkable by the users and one would like to have such a guarantee to hold
over all possible configurations of the data. One possible way of tackling this problem is to
let the algorithm halt with an output “No Reply” when this assumption fails (Dwork and
Lei, 2009; Avella-Medina and Brunel, 2019). Condition 3 is a smoothness condition on Ψ˙ at
Fn, similar to Condition 4 in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012). It is a technical assumption used
when upper bounding the smooth sensitivity by the gross-error sensitivity. The constants
C1 and C2 are effectively Lipschitz constants.
We would like to highlight that since the differential privacy paradigm assumes a remote
access query framework where the user does not get to see the data, in principle it is not
immediate that the user will be able to check basic features of the data e.g. whether the
design matrix is full rank before performing an analysis. This is a serious limitation of
this paradigm as it more generally prevents users from performing exploratory data analysis
before fitting a model and it is also unclear how to do model checking and run diagnostics on
fitted models. One would have to develop differentially private analogues of the whole data
analysis pipeline in order to allow a data analyst to perform rigorous statistical analysis. An
interesting recent development in this direction in a regression setting is the work of Chen
et al. (2018).
3.2 A general construction
Let us now introduce our mechanism for constructing differentially private M-estimators.
Given a statistical M-functional T , we propose the randomized estimator
AT (Fn) := T (Fn) + γ(T, Fn)
5
√
2 log(n) log(2/δ)
εn
Z, (3)
where Z is a p dimensional standard normal random variable. The intuition behind our
proposal is simple: the gross-error sensitivity γ(T, Fn) should be roughly of the same order
as the smooth sensitivity. Therefore multiplying it by
√
log(n) will guarantee that it upper
bounds the smooth sensitivity. This in turn suffices to guarantee (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
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From a computational perspective, using the empirical gross-error-sensitivity is much more
appealing than computing the exact smooth sensitivity. Indeed, the former can be further
upper bounded in practice using the empirical influence function whereas the latter can be
very difficult to compute in general as discussed in Nissim et al. (2007).
Theorem 1. Let n ≥ max[N0, 1C2m log(2/δ) [1+4ε{p+2 log(2/δ)} log(λmax(MFn )b )]2, (C ′)2m log(2/δ){2Lnb +
1
λmin(MFn )
(C1 + C2
Kn
b
)}2] and assume that Conditions 1–3 hold. Then hen AT is (ε, δ)–
differentially private.
Theorem 1 shows that our proposal leads to differentially private estimation. It builds
on two lemmas, relegated to the Appendix, that show that the smooth sensitivity of T
can indeed be upper bounded by twice its empirical gross error sensitivity. Note that the
minimum sample size requirement depends on the values of {N0, b,Kn, Ln, C1, C2} defined in
Conditions 1–3, as well as some constants C and C ′ resulting from our bounds on the error
incurred by approximating the smooth sensitivity with the empirical gross-error-sensitivity.
We provide a discussion about the evaluation of these constants in the Appendix.
3.3 Examples
Let us now present three important examples in order to illustrate how one can use readily
available robust M-estimators and their influence functions to derive bounds on their em-
pirical gross-error sensitivities. These quantities can in turn be used to release differentially
private estimates AT (Fn) defined in (3).
Example 1: Location-scale model
We consider the location-scale model discussed in (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009, Chapter
6). Here we observe an iid random sample of univariate random variables X1, . . . , Xn with
density function of the form 1
σ
f(x−µ
σ
), where f is some known density function, µ is some
unknown location parameter and σ is an unknown positive scale parameter. The problem
of simultaneous location and scale parameter estimation is motivated by invariance consid-
erations. In particular, in order to make an M-estimate of location scale invariant, we must
couple it with an estimate of scale. If the underlying distribution F is symmetric, location
estimates T and scale estimates S typically are asymptotically independent, and the asymp-
totic behavior of T depends on S only through the asymptotic value S(F ). We can therefore
afford to choose S on criteria other than low statistical variability. Huber (1964) generalized
the maximum likelihood system of equations by considering simultaneous M-estimates of
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location and scale any pair of statistics (Tn, Sn) determined by two equations of the form
n∑
i=1
ψ
(xi − Tn
Sn
)
= 0 and
n∑
i=1
χ
(xi − Tn
Sn
)
= 0,
which lead Tn = T (Fn) and Sn = S(Fn) to be expressed in terms of functionals T and S
defined by the population equations∫
ψ
(x− T (F )
S(F )
)
dF (x) = 0 and
∫
χ
(x− T (F )
S(F )
)
dF (x) = 0.
From the latter equations one can show that, if ψ is odd and χ is even, the influence functions
of T and S are
IF(x;T, F ) =
ψ
(
x−T (F )
S(F )
)
S(F )∫
ψ′
(
x−T (F )
S(F )
)
dF (x)
and IF(x;S, F ) =
χ
(
x−T (F )
S(F )
)
S(F )∫
χ′
(
x−T (F )
S(F )
)
x−T (F )
S(F )
dF (x)
. (4)
The problem of robust joint estimation of location and scale was introduced in the seminal
paper of Huber (1964). In the important case of the normal model, where F = Φ is the
standard normal distribution, a prominent example of the above system of equations is
Huber’s Proposal 2. In this case, ψ(r) = ψc(r) = min{c,max(−c, r)} is the Huber function
and χ(r) = χc(r) = ψc(r)
2 − κ, where κ = ∫ min(c2, x2)dΦ(x) is a constant that ensures
Fisher consistency at the normal model i.e. T (Φ) = µ and S(Φ) = σ2. This particular
choice of estimating equations and (4) show that the empirical gross-error sensitivities of
µ̂ = Tn = T (Fn) and σ̂ = Sn = S(Fn) are
γ(T, Fn) =
cσ̂
1
n
∑n
i=1 I
∣∣xi−µ̂
σ̂
∣∣<c and γ(S, Fn) =
(c2 − κ)σ̂
1
n
∑n
i=1
(
xi−µ̂
σ̂
)2
I∣∣xi−µ̂
σ̂
∣∣<c , (5)
where the last equation used that χ′c(r) = ψ
′
c(r)r almost everywhere and IE is the indicator
function taking the value 1 under the event E and is 0 otherwise. The formulas obtained in (5)
can be used in the Gaussian mechanism (3) for obtaining private location and scale estimates.
We refer the reader to Chapter 6 in Huber and Ronchetti (2009) for more discussion and
details on joint robust estimation of location and scale parameters.
Example 2: Linear regression
One can naturally build on the construction of the previous example to obtain robust esti-
mators for the linear regression model
yi = x
T
i β + ui, for i = 1, . . . , n, (6)
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where yi is the response variable, xi ∈ Rp the covariates and the noise terms are ui iid∼
N(0, σ2). The estimator discussed here is a Mallows’ type robust M-estimator defined as
(β̂, σ̂) = argmin
β,σ
{ n∑
i=1
σρc
(yi + xTi β
σ
)
w(xi) + κnσ
}
, (7)
where ρc is the Huber loss function with tuning parameter c, κ =
∫
min{c2, r2}dΦ(r) is a
Fisher consistency constant for σ and w : Rp → R≥0 is a downweighting function that controls
the impact of outlying covariates on the estimators of β̂ and σ̂ (Hampel et al., 1986). This
robust estimator uses Huber’s Proposal 2 for the estimation of the scale parameter. In this
case, the influence function of the estimator β̂ = T (Fn) is
IF(x, y;T, F ) = M−1F ψc
(y − xTT (F )
S(F )
)
xw(x),
whereMF =
∫
xxTw(x)ψ′c(r)dF and r =
y−xTT (F )
S(F )
. ThereforeMFn =
1
n
∑n
i=1 xxx
T
i w(xi)I|r̂i|≤c
with r̂i = (yi − xTi β̂)/σ̂, and assuming that supx ‖xw(x)‖ ≤ K˜, we see that γ(T, Fn) ≤
λmin(MFn)
−1cK˜. This last bound can be used for the release of a differentially private es-
timates of β. Note also that using the derivations from Example 1 we also have that the
empirical gross-error sensitivity of σ̂ = S(F ) is γ(S, Fn) = [
1
n
∑n
i=1 r̂
2
i I|r̂i|≤c]
−1(c2 − κ)σ̂.
Example 3: Generalized linear models
Generalized linear models (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989) assume that conditional on some
covariates, the response variables belong to the exponential family i.e. the response variables
Y1, . . . , Yn are drawn independently from the densities of the form
f(yi; θi) = exp
[{
yiθi − b(θi)
}
/φ+ c(yi, φ)
]
,
where a(·), b(·) and c(·) are specific functions and φ a nuisance parameter. Thus E(Yi) =
µi = b
′(θi) and var(Yi)= v(µi) = φb′′(θi) and g(µi) = ηi = xTi β, where β ∈ Rp is the vector
of parameters, xi ∈ Rp is the set of explanatory variables and g(·) the link function.
Cantoni and Ronchetti (2001) proposed a class of M-estimators for GLM which can be
viewed as a natural robustification of the quasilikelihood estimators of Wedderburn (1974).
Their robust quasilikelihood is
ρn(β) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
QM(yi, x
T
i β),
where the functions QM(yi, x
T
i β) can be written as
QM(yi, x
T
i β) =
∫ µi
s˜
ν(yi, t)w(xi)dt− 1
n
n∑
j=1
µj∫
t˜
E
{
ν(yi, t)
}
w(xj)dt
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with ν(yi, t) = ψ{(yi− t)/
√
v(t)}/√v(t), s˜ such that ψ{(yi− s˜)/√v(s˜)} = 0 and t˜ such that
E
[
ψ{(yi− s˜)/
√
v(s˜)}] = 0. The function ψ(·) is bounded and protects against large outliers
in the responses, and w(·) downweights leverage points. The estimator of β̂ of β derived
from the minimization of this loss function is the solution of the estimating equation
Ψ(n)(β) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Ψ
(
yi, x
T
i β
)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
ψ(ri)
1√
v(µi)
w(xi)
∂µi
∂β
− a(β)
}
= 0, (8)
where ri = (yi − µi)/
√
v(µi) and a(β) = n
−1∑n
i=1E{ψ(ri)/
√
v(µi)}w(xi)∂µi/∂β ensures
Fisher consistency and can be computed using the formulas in Appendix A of Cantoni and
Ronchetti (2001). We note that Appendix B of the same paper show that MF is of the form
1
n
XTBX and that these estimators and formulas are implemented in the function glmrob
of the R package robustbase. They can be used to used to bound the empirical gross-error
sensitivity with γ(T, Fn) ≤ λmin(MFn)−1Kn where Kn is as in Condition 1 and will be depend
on the choices of ψ and w as was the case in Example 2.
3.4 Convergence rates
We provide upper bounds for the convergence rates of AT (Fn). Our result is an extension of
Theorem 3 in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012).
Theorem 2. Suppose Conditions 1–2 hold. Then, for τ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least
1− τ
‖AT (Fn)− T (F )‖ ≤ ‖T (Fn)− T (F )‖+ C
√
log(n) log(2/δ)Kn{√p+
√
log(1/τ)}
εn
for some positive constant C. If in addition
Kn
√
m log(n) log(1/δ)√
nε
→ 0 as n→∞, then
AT (Fn)− T (F ) = T (Fn)− T (F ) + op(1/
√
n).
A direct consequence of the above result and (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009, Corollary 6.7)
is that AT (Fn) is asymptotically normally distributed as stated next.
Corollary 1. Assume that p is fixed and that Conditions 1–2 hold. Further assume that
EFθ0 [‖Ψ(X, θ0)‖2] is nonzero and finite. If
Kn
√
log(n) log(1/δ)
ε
√
n
→ 0 as n → ∞, then we have
that √
n(AT (Fn)− T (F ))→d N(0, V (T, F )).
Remark 1. This asymptotic normality result can be easily extended to the case where p
diverges as n increases. In particular, invoking the results of He and Shao (2000) asymptotic
normality holds assuming p
2 log p
n
→ 0. Note also that when p diverges, Kn will be diverging
even for robust estimators as componentwise boundedness of Ψ implies that Kn = O(
√
p).
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3.5 Efficiency, truncation and robustness properties
Smith (2008, 2011) introduced a class of asymptotically efficient point estimators obtained
by averaging subsampled estimators and adding well calibrated noise using the Laplace
mechanism of Dwork et al. (2006). Unfortunately his construction relies heavily on the
assumption that the diameter of the parameter space is known when calibrating the noise
added to the output. Furthermore it is also assumed that we observe bounded random
variables. Variants of this assumption are common in the differential privacy literature
(Smith, 2011; Lei, 2011; Bassily et al., 2014). Our estimators can bypass these issues as
long as the Ψ diverges slower than
√
n. In particular, this is easily achievable with robust
M-estimators since by construction they have a bounded Ψ. Alternatively, we could use
truncated maximum likelihood score equations to obtain asymptotically efficient estimators
as shown next.
Corollary 2. Let Tn denote the M-functional defined by the truncated score function
sc(x, θ) =
∂ log fθ(x)
∂θ
wc,θ(x), where wc,θ(x) = min{1, c/‖∂ log fθ(x)∂θ ‖}, c is some positive con-
stant and fθ0 denotes the density of F . If c → ∞ and c log(n)√nε → 0 as n → ∞, then we have
that √
n(ATn(Fn)− θ0)→d N(0, I−1(θ0)),
where I(θ0) denotes the Fisher information matrix.
The truncated maximum likelihood construction is reminiscent of the estimator of Catoni
(2012). The latter also uses a diverging level of truncation, but as a tool for achieving op-
timal non-asymptotic sub-Gaussian-type deviations for mean estimators under heavy tailed
assumptions.
From a robust statistics point of view a diverging level of truncation is not a fully satis-
factory solution. Indeed, it is well known that maximum likelihood estimators can be highly
sensitive to the presence of small fractions of contamination in the data. This remains
true for the truncated maximum likelihood estimator if the truncation level is allowed to
diverge as it entails that the estimator will fail to have a bounded influence function asymp-
totically and will therefore not be robust in this sense. Interestingly, Chaudhuri and Hsu
(2012) showed that any differentially private algorithm needs to satisfy a somehow weaker
degree of robustness. Our next Theorem provides a result in the same spirit for multivariate
M-estimators.
Theorem 3. Let ε ∈ (0, log 2
2
) and δ ∈ (0, ε
17
). Let F be the family of all distributions over
X ⊂ Rp and let A be any (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm of T (F ). For all n ∈ N and
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F ∈ F there exists a radius ρ = ρ(n) = 1
n
d log 2
2ε
e and a distribution G ∈ F with dTV (F,G) ≤ ρ,
such that either
EFnEA
[
‖A(D(Fn))− T (F )‖
]
≥ ρ
16
γ(T, F ) + o(ρ)
or
EGnEA
[
‖A(D(Gn))− T (G)‖
]
≥ ρ
16
γ(T, F ) + o(ρ),
where Fn and Gn denote empirical distributions obtained from F and G respectively.
Theorem 3 states that the convergence rates of any differentially private algorithm A
estimating the M-functional T is lower bounded by ργ(T, F ) in a small neighborhood of F .
Therefore M-functionals T with diverging influence functions will have slower convergence
rates for any algorithm A in all such neighborhoods. In this sense some degree of robustness
is needed in order to obtain informative differential private algorithms and the theorem
suggests that the influence function has to scale at most as ρ−1 = O(εn).
4 Differentially private inference
We now present our core results for privacy-preserving hypothesis testing building on the
randomization scheme introduced in the previous section.
4.1 Background
We denote the partition of a p dimensional vector v into p − k and k components by v =
(vT(1), v
T
(2))
T . We are interested in testing hypothesis of the form H0 : θ = θ0, where θ0 =
(θT0(1), 0
T )T and θ0(1) is unspecified against the alternative H1 : θ0(2) 6= 0 where θ0(1) is
unspecified. We assume throughout that the dimension k is fixed. A well known result in
statistics states that the Wald, score and likelihood ratio tests are asymptotically optimal
and equivalent in the sense that they converge to the uniformly most powerful test (Lehmann
and Romano, 2006). The level functionals of these test statistics can be approximated by
functionals of the form
α(Fn) := 1−Hk(nU(Fn)TU(Fn)) (9)
where Hk(·) is the cumulative distribution function of a χ2k random variable, U(Fn) is a
standardized functional such that under the null hypothesis U(F ) = 0 and
√
n(U(Fn)− U(F ))→d N(0, Ik). (10)
Heritier and Ronchetti (1994) proposed robust tests based on M-estimators. Their main
advantage over their classical counterparts is they have bounded level and power influence
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functions. Therefore these tests are stable under small arbitrary contamination under both
the null hypothesis and the alternative. Following Heritier and Ronchetti (1994) we therefore
consider the three classes of tests described next.
1. A Wald-type test statistic is a quadratic statistic of the form
W (Fn) := T (Fn)
T
(2)(V (T, F )(22))
−1T (Fn)(2). (11)
2. A score (or Rao)-type test statistic has the form
R(Fn) := Z(T, Fn)
TU(T, F )−1Z(T, Fn), (12)
where Z(T, Fn) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 Ψ(Xi, TR(Fn))(2), TR is the restricted M-functional defined
as the solution of ∫
Ψ(x, TR(F ))(1)dF = 0 and TR(F )(2) = 0,
U(T, F ) = M(22.1)V (T, F )(22)M
T
(22.1) is a positive definite matrix and M(22.1) = M(22) −
M(21)M
−1
(11)M(12) with M = M(T, F )
3. A likelihood ratio-type test has the form
S(Fn) :=
2
n
n∑
i=1
{ρ(xi, T (Fn))− ρ(xi, TR(Fn))}, (13)
where ρ(x, 0) = 0, ∂
∂θ
ρ(x, θ) = Ψ(x, θ) and T and TR are the M-functionals of the full
and restricted models respectively. As showed in Heritier and Ronchetti (1994) the
likelihood ratio functional is asymptotically equivalent to the quadratic form S˜(F ) :=
ULR(F )
TULR(F ) where ULR(F ) = M
1/2
(22.1)T (F )(2).
Note that in practice the matrices M(T, F ), U(T, F ) and V (T, F ) need to be estimated. We
discuss this point in Section 4.6.
4.2 Private inference based on the level gross-error sensitivity
We can use any of the robust test statistics described above to provide differential private
p-values using an analogue construction to the one introduced for estimation in Section 3.
Our proposal for differentially private testing is to build p-values of the form
Aα(Fn) := α(Fn) + γ(α;Fn)
5
√
2 log(n) log(2/δ)
εn
Z,
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where Z is an independent standard normal random variable. The rationale behind our
construction is that γ(α, Fn) is the right scaling factor for applying the Gaussian mechanism
to α(Fn) since it should roughly be of the same order as its smooth sensitivity. Note also
that one can use Aα(Fn) to construct randomized counterparts to the test statistics (11),
(12) and (13) by simply computing
Q(Fn) := H
−1
k (Aα(Fn)),
that is by evaluating the quantile function of a χ2k at Aα(Fn). Note that we can also apply
the Gaussian mechanism to the Wald, score and likelihood ratio type statistics of Section 4.1
and construct differentially private p-values from them. Indeed postprocessing preserves dif-
ferential privacy so computing the induced p-values preserves the privacy guarantees (Dwork
and Roth, 2014, Proposition 2.1). Our theoretical results extend straightforwardly to this
alternative approach and the numerical performance is nearly identical to the one presented
in this paper in our experiments. The following theorem establishes the differential privacy
guarantee of our proposal.
Theorem 4. Let n ≥ max[N0, 1C2m log(2/δ){1+4ε(p+2 log(2/δ)) log(Cn,k,U)}2, C2Um log(1/δ) K
2
n
λmax(MFn )
{1+
2Ln
b
+ 1
λmin(MFn )
(C1+C2
Kn
b
)}2], where CU and Cn,k,U are constants depending on the test func-
tional. If Conditions 1–3 hold, then Aα is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
The minimum sample size required in Theorem 4 is similar to that of Theorem 1. In
particular it also depends on the same {N0, b,Kn, Ln, C1, C2, C}, as well as the test specific
constants CU and Cn,k,U resulting from our bounds on the error incurred by approximating
the smooth sensitivity of the level functionals by their the empirical gross-error sensitivity.
A discussion on these constants can be found in the Appendix.
4.3 Examples
The following two examples show how to upper bound empirical the level gross-error sensi-
tivity γ(α, Fn) required for the construction of our differentially private p-values.
Example 4 : Testing and confidence intervals in linear regression
We consider the problem of hypothesis testing in the setting considered in Example 2. We
focus on the same Mallow’s estimator in combination with the Wald statistics Wn = W (Fn)
defined in (11) for hypothesis testing. We first note that from the chain rule, the influence
function of W at the Fn is
IF(x;W,Fn) = 2T (Fn)
T
(2)(V (T, F )(22))
−1IF(x;T, Fn)(2).
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It follows that γ(W,Fn) ≤ 2λmin(V (T, F )(22))−1‖T (Fn)(2)‖γ(T(2), Fn) and the respective level
gross-error sensitivity can be bounded as γ(αW , Fn) ≤ nH ′k(nWn)γ(W,Fn). In the case of
univariate null hypothesis of the form H0 : βj = 0 these expressions become
IF(x;W,Fn) =
2T (Fn)j
V (T, F )jj
IF(x;T, Fn)j and γ(αW , Fn) ≤ 2nH ′n(nWn)
|T (Fn)j|
V (T, F )jj
‖(M−1Fn )j·‖Kn,
where (M−1Fn )j· denotes the jth row of M
−1
Fn
. The above bound on γ(αW , Fn) can be used in
the Gaussian mechanism suggested in Section 4.2 for reporting differentially private p-values
AαW (Fn) accompanying the regression slope estimates AT (Fn) of Example 2.
We further note that since (ε, δ)-differential privacy is not affected by post-processing,
one can also construct confidence intervals using the reported p-value AαW (Fn). Since the
asymptotic distribution of the Wald test is a χ21 for the null hypothesis H0 : βj = 0, a
natural way to construct a confidence interval is to map the value AαW (Fn) to the quantile
of χ21 and output the interval defined by its squared root. More precisely, one can first
compute Q
(ε,δ)
n = H
−1
1 (AαW (Fn)) and then report the differentially private confidence interval
(−
√
Q
(ε,δ)
n ,
√
Q
(ε,δ)
n ).
Example 5: Testing and confidence intervals in logistic regression
Let us now return to the robust quasilikelihood estimator discussed in Example 3 and focus
on the special case of binary regression with canonical link. Note that if one chooses ψ(r) = r
and w(x) = 1 in (8), the resulting estimator is equivalent to logistic regression. In general
(8) will take the form
1
n
n∑
i=1
{
ψ(ri)
e
1
2
xTi β
1 + ex
T
i β
w(xi)xi − a(β)
}
= 0,
where ri = (yi − pi)/
√
pi(1− pi) and pi = ex
T
i β
1+ex
T
i
β
. In this case, if supx ‖xw(x)‖ ≤ K˜ and
|ψ(r)| ≤ cψ, then the gross-error sensitivity of β̂ = T (Fn) can be bounded as γ(T, Fn) ≤
2λmin(MFn)
−1cψK˜. For example if we consider the weight function w(x) = {1, 1/‖x‖} and
the Huber function ψ(r) = ψc(r), then K˜ = 1 and cψ is the constant of the Huber function.
Note also that Appendix B in Cantoni and Ronchetti (2001) provide formulas for MF when
ψ(r) = ψc(r) and this bound is readily obtained using standard functions in R. Furthermore
the computation of the the gross-error sensitivity for the level functional of the Wald statistics
follows from the same arguments discussed in Example 4. The extension of the proposed
construction of confidence intervals is also immediate.
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4.4 Validity of the tests
In this subsection we establish statistical consistency guarantees for our differentially private
tests. The next theorem establishes rates of convergence and demonstrates the asymptotic
equivalence between them and their non-private counterparts under both the null distribution
and a local alternative.
Theorem 5. Assume Conditions 1 and 2 hold and let α(·) be the level functional of any of
the tests (11)–(13). Then, for τ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− τ
|Aα(Fn)− α(F )| ≤ |α(Fn)− α(F )|+ C
√
log(n) log(2/δ) log(2/τ)Kn√
n/kε
for some positive constant C. Furthermore, if
Kn
√
log(n) log(1/δ)√
n/kε
→ 0 as n→∞ then
Q(Fn) = Q0(Fn) + oP (1),
where Q0(Fn) = H
−1
k (α(Fn)).
A direct consequence of Theorem 5 is that the asymptotic distribution of Q(Fn) is the
same as the one of its non-private counterpart Q0(Fn) computed from the level functional
of any of the tests (11)–(13). Therefore the results of Heritier and Ronchetti (1994) also
give the asymptotic distributions of Q(Fn) under both H0 : θ = θ0 and H1,n : θ = θ0 +
∆√
n
for some ∆ > 0. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2 of that paper establish that (11) and
(12) are asymptotically equivalent as they both converge to χ2k under H0 and to χ
2
k(δ) with
δ = ∆TV (T, F )−1(22)∆ under H1,n. Proposition 3 of the same paper shows that (13) converges
instead to a weighted sum of k independent random variables distributed as χ21 under H0
and to a weighted sum of k independent random variables χ21(δi) for some δ1, . . . , δk > 0
under H1,n.
4.5 Robustness properties of differentially private tests
The tests associated with the differentially private p-values proposed in Section 4.2 enjoy
some degree of robustness by construction. In particular, it is not difficult to extend the
lower bound of Theorem 3 to the level functionals considered in this section.
Theorem 6. Assume the conditions of Theorem 3, but letting A be any (ε, δ)-differentially
private algorithm of the level functional α(F ) of either of the tests (11)–(13). Then either
EFnEA
[
|A(D(Fn))− α(F )‖
]
≥ ρ
16
⌈
log 2
2ε
⌉
µγ(U, F )2 + o
(
ρ
⌈
log 2
2ε
⌉)
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or
EGnEA
[
|A(D(Gn))− α(G)|
]
≥ ρ
16
⌈
log 2
2ε
⌉
µγ(U, F )2 + o
(
ρ
⌈
log 2
2ε
⌉)
,
where µ = − ∂
∂ζ
Hk(q1−α0 ; ζ)
∣∣∣
ζ=0
, Hk(·, ζ) is the cumulative distribution function of a non-
central χ2k(ζ) with non-centrality parameter ζ ≥ 0, q1−α0 is the 1 − α0 quantile of a χ2k
distribution and α0 = α(F ) is the nominal level of the test.
Similar to Theorem 3 , Theorem 6 states that the convergence rates of any differentially
private algorithm A estimating the level functional α is lower bounded by the the gross-
error sensitivity of U(F ) in a small neighborhood of F , where U is defined in (9) and (10).
Therefore functionals U with diverging influence functions will lead to slower convergence
rates for any algorithm A in all such neighborhoods. The result suggests that the influence
function has to scale at most as ρ−1 = O(ε
√
n).
Note that the appearance of the quadratic term γ(U, F )2 in the lower bound is intuitive
from the definition of α(F ) and is in line with the robustness characterization of the level
influence function of (Heritier and Ronchetti, 1994; Ronchetti and Trojani, 2001). In fact
we can extend the robustness results of these papers to our setting and show that our tests
have stable level and power functions in shrinking contamination neighborhoods of the model
when Ψ is bounded.
We need to introduce additional notation in order to state the result. Consider the
(t, n)-contamination neighborhoods of Fθ0 defined by
Ut,n(Fθ0) :=
{
F 0t,n,G =
(
1− t√
n
)
Fθ0 +
t√
n
G, G arbitrary
}
and let Un = U(Fn) be a statistical functional with bounded influence function and such
that U(F ) = 0 and √
n(U(Fn)− U(Ft,n,G))→d N(0, Ik)
uniformly over the sequence of (t, n)-neighborhoods Ut,n(Fθ0). Further let
{F altη,n}n∈N :=
{(
1− η√
n
)
Fθ0 +
η√
n
Fθ1
}
n∈N
be a sequence of local alternatives to Fθ0 and
Ut,n(F
alt
η,,n) :=
{
F 1t,n,G :=
(
1− t√
n
)
F altη,n +
t√
n
G, G arbitrary
}
be the corresponding neighborhood of F altθ,n for a given n. We denote by {F 0t,n,G}n∈N a sequence
of (t, n,G)-contaminations of the underlying null distribution Fθ0 , each of them belonging
23
to the neighborhood Ut,n(Fθ0). Similarly, we denote by {F 1t,n,G}n∈N a sequence of (t, n,G)-
contaminations of the underlying local alternatives F altη,n, each of them belonging to the
neighborhood Ut,n(F
alt
η,n). Finally, we denote by Aβ and β the power functionals of the tests
based on Aα and α respectively.
The following corollary follows from (Ronchetti and Trojani, 2001, Theorems 1–3) and
Theorem 5. It shows that the level and power of our differentially private tests are stable
in the contamination neighborhoods Ut,n(Fθ0) and Ut,n(F
alt
η,,n) when the influence function of
the functional U is bounded.
Corollary 3. Our differentially private Wald, score and likelihood ratio type tests have
stable level and power functionals when Kn <∞ in the sense that for all G
lim
n→∞
Aα(Ft,n,G) = lim
n→∞
α(Ft,n,G)
=α0 + t
2µ
∥∥∥∫ IF(x;U, Fθ0)dG(x)∥∥∥2 + o(t2)
and
lim
n→∞
Aβ(F
1
t,n,G) = lim
n→∞
β(F 1t,n,G)
= lim
n→∞
β(F altη,n)
+ 2µtη
∫
IF(x;U, F altη,n)
TdG(x)
∫
IF(x;U, Fθ0)dFθ1(x) + o(η),
where µ is as in Theorem 6.
4.6 Accounting for the change of variance sensitivity
In practice the standardizing matrices M(T, F ), U(T, F ) and V (T, F ) are estimated, so the
actual form of the functional U defining the test functional is
U(Fn) = S(Fn)
−1/2T˜ (Fn),
where T˜ is such that T˜ (F ) = 0 and
√
n(T˜ (Fn) − T˜ (F )) →d N(0, S(F )). The general
construction of Section 4.2 is still valid provided additional regularity conditions on Ψ hold.
In particular, it remains true that γ(α, F ) can be used to upper bound Γ˜n provided
∣∣∣ ∂∂θj Ψ˙∣∣∣ <
∞ for all j = 1, . . . , p. This condition implies third order infinitesimal robustness in the
sense of La Vecchia et al. (2012). From a practical point of view an upper bound on γ(α, Fn)
can be computed in this case using both the influence function and the change of variance
function of T . The latter accounts for the fact the S(F ) is also estimated. We refer the
reader to the Appendix for the precise form of the the change of variance function of general
M-estimators and a more detailed discussion of the implications of estimating the variance
in the noise calibration of our Gaussian mechanism.
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5 Numerical examples
We investigate the finite sample performance of our proposals with simulated and real data.
We focus on a linear regression setting where we obtain consistent slope parameter estimates
at the model and show that our differentially private tests reach the desired nominal level
and has power under the alternative even in mildly contaminated scenarios. We first present
a simulation experiments that shows the statistical performance of our methods in small
samples before turning to a real data example with a large sample size. For the sake of space
we relegate to the Appendix a more extended discussion about other existing methods, some
complementary simulation results and a discussion of the evaluation of the constants of
Theorems 1 and 4.
5.1 Synthetic data
We consider a simulation setting similar to the one of Salibian-Barrera et al. (2016) in order
to explore the behavior of our consistent differentially private estimates and illustrate the
efficiency loss incurred by them, relative to their non private counterparts. We generate
the linear regression model (6) with β = (1, 1, 0, 0)T , xi ∼ N(0, V ) and V = {0.5|j−k|}4j,k=1.
We illustrate the effect of small amounts of contaminated data by generating outliers in the
responses as well as bad leverage points. This was done by replacing 1% of the values of y
and x2 with observations following a N(12, 0.1
2) and a N(5, 0.12) distribution respectively.
All the results reported below were obtained over 5000 replications and sample sizes ranging
from n = 100 to n = 1000.
The differentially private estimates considered here is the same Mallow’s type robust
regression estimator of Example 2. In particular, we consider the robust estimators of β
defined by
(β̂0, β̂, σ̂) = argmin
β,σ
{ n∑
i=1
σρc
(yi − β0 + xTi β
σ
)
w(xi) + κcnσ
}
,
where ρc is the Huber loss function with tuning parameter c, w : Rp → R≥0 is a downweight-
ing function and κc =
∫
min{x2, c2}dΦ(x) is a constant ensuring that σ̂ is consistent. In all
our simulations we set c = 1.345 and w(x) = min{1, 2/‖x‖2}. This robust estimator uses
Huber’s Proposal 2 for the estimation of the scale parameter (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009).
We computed it using the function rlm of the R package “MASS”. Figure 1 shows how the
level of privacy affects the performance of estimation relative to that of the target robust
estimator. In particular, it illustrates the slower convergence of our differential private esti-
mators for the range of privacy parameters ε = {0.2, 0.1, 0.05} and δ = 1/n2. Figure 2 shows
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Figure 1: The plots show the componentwise estimation error of the parameter β for clean data
sets ranging from size n = 100 to n = 1000. The dotted dark blue line shows the median estimated
value of the target robust estimator while the light blue shaded area give pointwise quartiles of
the same estimator. The larger shaded gray areas give the pointwise quartiles of the estimated
differentially private estimators with privacy parameters ε = {0.2, 0.1, 0.05}.
the empirical level of the Wald statistics for testing the null hypothesis H0 : β3 = β4 = 0
with increasing sample sizes and nominal level of 5%. We see that all the tests have good
empirical coverage and that as expected the differentially private tests are not too sensitive
to the presence of a small amount of contamination. Interestingly, the empirical levels of the
robust test and the differentially private one are nearly identical when the privacy parame-
ters ε = {1, 0.1} and n ≥ 200. When we choose the very stringent ε = 0.001 the noise added
to the target p-value is so large that the resulting test amounts to flipping a coin.
In order to explore the power of our tests we set the regression parameter β to (1, 1, ν, 0)T ,
where ν varied in the range [−0.5, 0.5]. As seen in Figure 3 (a) the power function of the
three tests considered is almost indistinguishable when the data follows the normal model
(6). Figure 3 (b) shows that the power functions of the robust Wald tests and the derived
differentially private test remain almost identical to the one they have without contamination.
This reflects the power function stability result established in Theorem 3. From the same
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figure, we clearly see that the power function of the Wald test constructed using least squares
estimator is shifted as a result of a small amount of contamination.
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Figure 2: (a) shows the convergence of our Wald statistic to the nominal level 0.05 at the model
while (b) shows its behavior under 1% contamination. We report four empirical differentially private
level curves: dotted lines, ε = 1; dash-dotted lines, ε = 0.1; dash-dotted lines, ε = 0.01, two-dashed
lines, ε = 0.001.
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Figure 3: (a) shows the power function of our Wald statistic at the model when n = 200
and β3 ∈ [−0.5, 0.5]; (b) shows its behavior under 1% contamination. We report four empirical
differentially private power curves: dotted lines, ε = 1; dash-dotted lines, ε = 0.1; dash-dotted
lines, ε = 0.01, two-dashed lines, ε = 0.001.
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5.2 Application to housing price data
We revisit the housing price data set considered in Lei (2011). The data consist of 348′189
houses sold in the San Francisco Bay Area Between 2003 and 2006, for which we have the
price, size, year of transaction, and county in which the house is located. The data set has
two continuous covariates (price and size), one ordinal variable with 4 levels (year), and
one categorical variable (county) with 9 levels. We exclude the observations with missing
entries and follow the preprocessing suggested in Lei (2011), i.e. we filter out data points
with price outside the range of $105 ∼ $9× 105 or with size larger than 3′000 squared feet.
After preprocessing, we have 250′070 observations and the county variables has 6 levels after
combination. We also consider the same data without filtering price and size, in which case
we are left with 286′537 observations. We fitted a simple linear regression model in order to
predict the housing price using ordinary least squares, a robust estimator and differentially
private estimators. We computed the private estimator described in 5.1 as well as the differ-
entially private M-estimators based on a perturbed histogram with enhanced thresholding as
in Lei (2011). We assess the performance of the differentially private regression coefficients
by comparing them with their non-private counterparts. More specifically, we look at the
componentwise relative deviance from the non-private estimates dj = |β̂DPj /β̂j − 1| where
β̂j stands for the jth regression coefficient of either the ordinary least squares or the robust
estimator, and β̂DPj is its differentially private counterpart. In order to account for the ran-
domness of the Gaussian mechanism, we report the mean square error of the deviations dj
obtained over 500 realizations. The results are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
It is interesting to notice that with the preprocessed data the least squares fit and the
robust fit are very similar. However with the raw data, the large unfiltered values of price
and size affect to a greater extent the estimator of Lei (2011). The accuracy of this estimator
also deteriorates for the raw data as reflected by the larger mean squared deviations obtained
in this case. On the other hand, our differentially private estimators give similar results for
both preprocessed and raw data, in terms of values of the fitted regression coefficients and
mean squared deviations from the target robust estimates. This is a particularly desirable
feature when privacy is an issue since researchers are likely to have limited access to the data
and hence carrying out a careful preprocessing might not be possible. Note also that for the
same level of privacy ε = 10−1, our method provides much more accurate estimation. The
poorer performance of the histogram estimator is to be expected as it suffers from the curse
of dimensionality. In this particular example Lei’s estimator effectively reduces the sample
size to only 2400 pseudo observations that can be sampled from the differentially private
estimated histogram.
28
Table 1: Linear regression coefficients using the Bay housing data after preprocessing. The second
and third columns give the regression coefficients obtained by ordinary least squares and the robust
Mallow’s estimator without privacy guarantees. We compare the performance of their differentially
private counterparts using the perturbed histogram approach and our Gaussian mechanism for a
fixed privacy level ε = 0.1. The reported number is the componentwise root mean square relative
error over 1000 realizations.
ε = 0.1
Method OLS Rob PHOLS PHRob DP
Intercept 135141 118479 8.9 10.4 1.4×10−4
Size 209 216 4.0 5.1 7.3×10−2
Year 56375 58136 2.6 5.2 2.8×10−4
County 2 -53765 -59605 8.1 7.6 2.9×10−4
County 3 146593 149202 2.7 3.8 1.1×10−4
County 4 -27546 -29681 37.7 28.4 5.2×10−4
County 5 45828 41184 7.8 16.5 4.1×10−4
County 6 -140738 -139780 3.6 7.7 1.1×10−4
Table 2: Linear regression coefficients using the raw Bay housing data without preprocessing.
The reported numbers are as in Table 1.
ε = 0.1
Method OLS Rob PHOLS PHRob DP
Intercept 456344 101524 33.4 28.6 1.5×10−4
Size 0.5 229 247.1 229.3 6.2×10−2
Year 71241 65170 87.8 85.7 2.2×10−4
County 2 -11261 -53727 416.8 376.9 2.9×10−4
County 3 275058 196967 82.4 80.7 7.5×10−5
County 4 -16425 -29337 569.0 519.1 4.8×10−4
County 5 98775 57524 101.9 95.9 2.6×10−4
County 6 -149027 -152499 143.3 141.2 9.2×10−5
We see from the reported values in Tables 1–2 that the accuracy of our private estimator
is comparable with that of the perturbed histogram if we impose the much stronger privacy
requirement ε = 10−3. This feature is also very appealing in practice and confirms what our
theory predicts and what we observed in simulations: we can afford a fixed privacy budget
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with a smaller sample size or equivalently, for a fixed sample size we can ensure a higher
level of privacy using our methods. Note that given the large sample size of this data set,
unsurprisingly all the covariates are significantly predictive for the non-private estimators.
All univariate Wald statistics for the slope parameters in this example yield p-values smaller
than 10−16 for the non-private estimators. Since our differentially private p-values give
similar results we chose not to report them.
6 Concluding remarks
We introduced a general framework for differentially private statistical inference for para-
metric models based on M-estimators. The central idea of our approach is to leverage tools
from robust statistics in the design of a mechanism for the release of differentially private
statistical outputs. In particular, we release noisy versions of statistics of interest that we
view as functionals of the empirical distribution induced by the data. We use a bound of their
influence function in order to scale the random perturbation added to the desired statistics
to guarantee privacy. As a result, we propose a new class of consistent differentially private
estimators that can be easily and efficiently computed, and provide a general framework for
parametric hypothesis testing with privacy guarantees.
An interesting extension to be explored in the future is the construction of differentially
private tests in the context of nonparametric and high-dimensional regression. In principle
the idea of using the influence function to calibrate the noise added to test functionals also
seems intuitive in these settings, but the technical challenge of these extensions is twofold.
First, there are no general results regarding the level influence function of tests for these
settings. Second, the influence function of nonparametric and high-dimensional penalized
estimators has been formulated for a fixed tuning parameter (Christmann and Steinwart,
2007; Avella-Medina, 2017). Since in practice this parameter is usually chosen by some data
driven criterion, it would be necessary to account for this selection step in the derivation of
differentially private statistics following the approach of this work. Another interesting di-
rection for future research is to explore whether information-standardized influence functions
could be used to derive better or more general differentially private estimators (Hampel et
al., 1986; He and Simpson, 1992). It would also be interesting to explore the construction
of tests based on alternative approaches to differential privacy such as objective function
perturbation (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2008; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kiefer et al., 2012)
or stochastic gradient descent (Rajkumar and Argawal, 2012; Bassily et al., 2014; Wang et
al., 2015).
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Appendix A: proof of main results
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Our argument consists of using Lemmas 1 and 2 to show that
√
log(n)
n
γ(T, Fn) upper
bounds the ξ-smooth sensitivity of the M-functional T . This suffices to show the desired re-
sult since choosing ξ = ε
4{p+2 log(2/δ)} guarantees (ε, δ)-differential privacy as shown in (Nissim
et al., 2007, Lemmas 2.6 and 2.9).
From Lemma 2 we have that
√
log nγ(T, Fn) > Γn for n ≥ (C ′)2m log(1/δ){ 2Lnbλmin(MFn )(C1+
C2Kn/b)}2. Given Lemma 1, it therefore remains to show that
√
log nγ(T, Fn)
n
≥ 1
bn
Kn exp
(
− ξC
√
mn log(2/δ) + ξ
)
. (14)
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Further note that γ(T, Fn) ≥ Kn/Bn, where Bn = λmax(MF ). Hence in order to show (14)
it would suffice to establish that√
log(n) ≥ Bn
b
exp
(
− ξC
√
mn log(2/δ) + ξ
)
or equivalently
2Cξ
√
mn log(2/δ)− 2ξ − 2 log(Bn/b) ≥ − log log(n). (15)
Since ξ ≤ ε
4{p+2 log(2/δ)} ≤ 1, the left hand side of (15) will be nonnegative if
n ≥
{
1 +
log(Bn/b)
ξ
}2 1
C2m log(2/δ)
≥
[
1 +
4{p+ 2 log(2/δ)} log(Bn/b)
ε
]2 1
C2m log(2/δ)
which holds by assumption. We have thus established (14) and hence that
√
log(n)
n
γ(T, Fn)
upper bounds the smooth sensitivity of T . Therefore the Gaussian mechanism with scaling
γ(T, Fn)
5
√
2 log(n) log(2/δ)
εn
guarantees (ε, δ)-differential privacy (Nissim et al., 2007, Lemmas
2.6 and 2.9).
In addition to Conditions 1–3 discussed in the main document, the statements of Lemmas
1 and 2 require three additional definitions introduced in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012). The
first two are fixed scale versions of the influence function and the gross error sensitivity, i.e.
for a fixed ρ > 0, we define
IFρ(x;T, F ) :=
T ((1− ρ)F + ρδx)− T (F )
ρ
and
γρ(T, F ) := sup
x∈X
‖IFρ(x;T, F )‖
The third important quantity appearing in our analysis is the supremum, over a Borel-
Cantelli type neighborhood, of the gross-error sensitivity i.e.
Γn := sup
{
γ1/n(T,G) : d∞(Fn, G) ≤ C
√
m log(2/δ)
n
}
. (16)
We are now ready to state the two main auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 1. Assume Conditions 1 and 2 hold. Then
SSξ(T,D(Fn)) ≤ max
{
2Γn
n
,
1
bn
Kn exp
(
− Cξ
√
mn log(2/δ) + ξ
)}
,
where C is as in (16).
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Proof. We adapt Lemma 1 in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012) to our setting. We will show that
for any D(G1) ∈ Rn×m we have that
e−ξdH(D(Fn),D(G1))LS
(
T,D(G1)
) ≤ max{2Γn/n, 1
bn
Kn exp
(− ξnrn + ξ)},
where rn = C
√
m log(2/δ)
n
. For this we consider two possible cases. First suppose that
[dH
(D(Fn),D(G1)) + 1]/n > rn. Letting G′1 such that dH(D(G1),D(G′1)) = 1 and taking
ρ = 1 in Lemma 7 we get that LS
(
T,D(G1)
) ≤ Kn
bn
since
‖T (G1)− T (G′1)‖ ≤
∥∥∥∫ 1
0
∫
IF(x;T, (1− t)G1 + tG′1)d(G1 −G′1)dt
∥∥∥
≤d∞(G1, G′1) sup
t∈[0,1]
γ(T, (1− t)G1 + tG′1)
≤Kn
bn
. (17)
Therefore
e−ξdH(D(Fn),D(G1))LS
(
T,D(G1)
) ≤ Kn
bn
exp
(− ξnrn + ξ).
Suppose now that [dH
(D(Fn),D(G1))+1]/n ≤ rn and fixD(G2) ∈ Rn×m such that dH(D(G1),D(G2)) =
1. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the index at which D(G1) and D(G2) differ. Finally let D(G3) ∈
R(n−1)×m be the data set obtained by removing the jth element of D(G1). Then by the
triangle inequality
d∞(Fn, G3) ≤ d∞(Fn, G1) + d∞(G3, G1) ≤
[
dH
(D(Fn),D(G1))+ 1]/n ≤ rn
and hence γ1/n(T,G3) ≤ Γn. Furthermore, using the triangle inequality we have that
‖T (G1)− T (G2)‖ = ‖T (G1)− T (G3) + T (G3)− T (G2)‖
=
1
n
‖IF1/n(xj;T,G3)− IF1/n(x′j;T,G3)‖
≤ 2
n
γ1/n(T,G3)
≤ 2Γn
n
.
Since the last bound holds for any choice of D(G2) we see that LS
(
T,D(G1)
) ≤ 2Γn/n and
consequently e−ξdH(D(Fn),D(G1))LS
(
T,D(G1)
) ≤ 2Γn/n.
Lemma 2. Assume Conditions 1–3 hold. Then
Γn ≤ 2γ(T, Fn) + C ′
√
m log(2/δ)
n
Knλmax(M
−1
Fn
)
{
2Ln/b+ λmax(M
−1
Fn
)(C1 + 2C2Kn/b)
}
for some positive constant C ′.
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Proof. First note that by Lemma 10
γ1/n(T,G) ≤ 2γ(T,G) +O
[Knλmax(M−1G )
n
{
2Ln/b+ λmax(M
−1
G )(C1 + 2C2Kn/b)
}]
(18)
as long as MG is positive definite for all G ∈ {H : d∞(Fn, H) ≤ C
√
m log(2/δ)
n
}. Provided this
condition holds, it would suffice to show that
γ(T,G) ≤ γ(T, Fn)+O
[√
m log(2/δ)
n
Knλmax(M
−1
Fn
)
{
2Ln/b+λmax(M
−1
G )(C1 +2C2Kn/b)
}]
.
This last inequality is a consequence of Lemma 11.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. First note that Theorem 3.1.1 in Vershynin (2018) guarantees that a p-dimensional
standard Gaussian random variables concentrates around
√
p. Specifically, for Z ∼ Np(0, I)
and with probability 1−τ , we have that ‖Z‖−√p ≤ C√log(1/τ) for some universal constant
C. Applying this result to our Gaussian mechanism shows that with probability 1− τ
‖AT (Fn)− T (Fn)‖ ≤ Cγ(T, Fn)5
√
2 log(n) log(2/δ)
εn
(
√
p+
√
log(1/τ)).
The first claimed result follows from the above expression since by Conditions 1 and 2 we
have that γ(T, Fn) = O(Kn). The second claim is verified by further noting that
AT (Fn)− T (F ) = T (Fn)− T (F ) + γ(T, Fn)5
√
2 log(n) log(2/δ)
εn
Z
= T (Fn)− T (F ) +Op
(Kn√log(n) log(2/δ)
εn
)
= T (Fn)− T (F ) + op(1/
√
n),
where the last equality leveraged the assumed scaling
Kn
√
log(n) log(1/δ)
ε
√
n
= o(1).
Proof of Corollary 2
Proof. It is easy to check that Tn satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2 and that Tn converges
to the maximum likelihood M-functional.
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Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. First note that
γρ(T, F ) = sup
z
1
ρ
∥∥T ((1− ρ)F + ∆x)− T (F )∥∥
≥ 1
ρ
∥∥T ((1− ρ)F + ∆x)− T (F )∥∥
=
1
ρ
∥∥ρ∫ IF(z;T, F )d(∆x − F ) + o(ρ)∥∥
=
1
ρ
∥∥ρIF(x;T, F ) + o(ρ)∥∥
≥ ∥∥IF(x;T, F )∥∥+ o(1),
where a von Mises expansion justifies the second equality and the third one follows from (2).
Taking the supremum over x in the last inequality we obtain
γρ(T, F ) ≥ γ(T, F ) + o(1).
The proof is completed by incorporating this result in the lower bound provided by Propo-
sition 1 below.
Proposition 1 is a generalization of Theorem 1 in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012) and it
constitutes a somehow more general result than Theorem 3 since it gives a lower bound for
any differentially private algorithm without restricting T (F ) to be an M-functional.
Proposition 1. Let ε ∈ (0, log 2
2
) and δ ∈ (0, ε
17
). Let F be the family of all distributions
over X ⊂ Rm and let A be any (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm approximating T (F ),
where T : F 7→ Rk with k ∈ {1, . . . , p}. For all n ∈ N and F ∈ F, there exists a radius
ρ = ρ(n) = 1
n
d log 2
2ε
e and a distribution G ∈ F with dTV (F,G) ≤ ρ, such that either
EFnEA
[
‖A(D(Fn))− T (F )‖
]
≥ ρ
16
γρ(T, F )
or
EGnEA
[
‖A(D(Gn))− T (G)‖
]
≥ ρ
16
γρ(T, F ),
where Fn and Gn denote empirical distributions obtained from F and G respectively.
Proof. The claimed result can be established by extending to our multivariate setting the
arguments provided in Theorem 1 of Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012). The only missing ingredient
is a multivariate version of their Lemma 3 that we derive in Lemma 4 below.
We will use the following result in the proof Lemma 4.
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Lemma 3. Let A : Rn×m 7→ Rk for k ∈ {1, . . . , p} be any (ε, δ)-differentially private algo-
rithm, and let D ∈ X n×m and D′ ∈ X n×m be two data sets which differ by less than n0 < n
entries. Then, for any S
P[A(D) ∈ S] ≥ e−n0εP[A(D′) ∈ S]− δ
1− e−ε .
Proof. The same arguments of Lemma 2 in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012) apply here.
Lemma 4. Let D ∈ X n×m and D′ ∈ X n×m be two data sets that differ in the value of
at most n0 < n entries. Furthermore let A : Rn×m 7→ Rk for k ∈ {1, . . . , p} be any (ε, δ)-
differentially private algorithm. For all 0 < γ < 1/3, and for all τ, τ ′ ∈ Rk, if n0 ≤ log(1/(2γ))ε
and if δ ≤ 1
4
γ(1− e−ε), then
EA
[
‖A(D)− τ‖+ ‖A(D′)− τ ′‖
]
≥ γ‖τ − τ ′‖.
Proof. We adapt the proof of Lemma 3 in Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012) to our setting. It
suffices to construct two disjoint hyperrectangles I and I ′ such that
PA[A(D) ∈ I] + PA[A(D′) ∈ I ′] ≤ 2(1− γ) (19)
EA
[
‖A(D)−τ‖∣∣A(D) ∈ I] ≥ 1
2
‖τ−τ ′‖ and EA
[
‖A(D′)−τ ′‖∣∣A(D′) ∈ I ′] ≥ 1
2
‖τ−τ ′‖ (20)
since they imply that
EA
[
‖A(D)− τ‖+ ‖A(D′)− τ ′‖
]
> EA
[
‖A(D)− τ‖∣∣A(D) /∈ I]PA[A(D) /∈ I] + EA[‖A(D′)− τ ′‖∣∣A(′D) /∈ I ′]PA[A(D′) /∈ I ′]
≥ 1
2
‖τ − τ ′‖
(
PA[A(D) /∈ I] + PA[A(D′) /∈ I ′]
)
≥ γ‖τ − τ ′‖.
Let us now build I and I ′. Write τ = (τ1, . . . , τk) and τ ′ = (τ ′1, . . . , τ
′
k). Without loss
of generality assume that τj < τ
′
j and let tj =
1
2
(τ ′j − τj) for all j = 1, . . . , p. Further
let Ij = (τj − tj, τj + tj) and I ′j = (τ ′j − tj, τ ′j + tj). By construction the hyperrectangles
I := I1 × I2 × · · · × Ik and I ′ := I ′1 × I ′2 × · · · × Ik are disjoint and satisfy (20). It remains
to show that (19) holds. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose (19) does not hold, then
2γ > PA
[
A(D) /∈ I
]
+ PA
[
A(D′) /∈ I ′
]
≥ PA
[
A(D) ∈ I ′
]
+ PA
[
A(D′) ∈ I
]
≥ e−n0ε
(
PA
[
A(D′) ∈ I ′
]
+ PA
[
A(D) ∈ I
])
− 2δ
1− e−ε
≥ e−n0ε2(1− γ)− γ
2
.
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The first inequality follows by assumption, the second from I ∩ I ′ = ∅, the third one from
Lemma 3 and the last one by assumption and δ ≤ 1
4
γ(1 − e−ε). Further note that the last
inequality leads to
e−n0ε2(1− γ)− γ
2
≥ 4γ(1− γ)− γ
2
≥ 7
2
γ − 4γ2 > 2γ
for γ ≤ 1
3
since n0 ≤ log(1/(2γ))ε . This is a contradiction and therefore (19) holds.
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proof follows from the arguments of Theorem 1 by combining Lemmas 5, 6 and
the results of Nissim et al. (2007).
From Lemma 6 we have that
√
log nγ(α, Fn) > Γ˜n for n ≥ C ′
√
m log(2/δ)Knλmax(M
−1
F )
{
1+
2Ln/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2Kn/b)
}
. Given Lemma 5, it therefore remains to show that
√
log nγ(α, Fn)
n
≥ Cn,kΓU,n exp
(
− Cξ
√
mn log(2/δ) + ξ
)
. (21)
Hence in order to show (21) it would suffice to establish that
2Cξ
√
mn log(2/δ)− 2ξ − 2 log
(nCn,kΓU,n
γ(α, Fn)
)
≥ − log log(n). (22)
Letting Cn,k,U =
nCn,kΓU,n
γ(α,Fn)
and since ξ ≤ ε
4{p+2 log(2/δ)} ≤ 1, the left hand side of (22) will be
nonnegative if
n ≥
{
1 +
log(Cn,k,U)
ξ
}2 1
C2m log(2/δ)
≥
[
1 +
4{p+ 2 log(2/δ)} log(Cn,k,U)
ε
]2 1
C2m log(2/δ)
.
This last inequality holds by assumption.
We introduce an analogue of the term Γn used in the proof of Theorem 1, but in the
context for level functionals, namely
Γ˜n := sup
{
γ1/n(α,G) : d∞(Fn, G) ≤ C
√
m log(2/δ)
n
}
. (23)
Γ˜n plays an important role in the analysis of our differentially private p-values. Lemmas 5
guarantees that for large n it suffices to control Γ˜n in order to bound the smooth sensitivity,
while Lemma 6 shows that Γ˜n is roughly of the same order as the empirical level gross-error
sensitivity.
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Lemma 5. Assume that Conditions 1 and 2 hold. Then
SSξ(α,D(Fn)) ≤ max
{
2Γ˜n
n
,Cn,kΓU,n exp
(
− Cξ
√
mn log(2/δ) + ξ
)}
,
where C is as in (23), ΓU,n = sup{supt∈[0,1] γ
(
U, (1 − t)Gn + tG′n
)
: dH
(D(Gn),D(G′n)) =
1, Gn, G
′
n ∈ Gn} and Cn,k = 2 (k−1)
(k−1)/2e−(k−1)/2√
n2k/2Γ(k/2)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function.
Proof. The result follows from arguments similar to those of Lemma 1. We will show that
for any D(G1) ∈ Rn×m we have that
e−ξdH(D(Fn),D(G1))LS(α,D(G1)) ≤ max
{
2Γ˜n
n
, exp
(− ξ(nrn − 1))},
where rn = C
√
m log(2/δ)
n
. For this we consider two possible cases. First suppose that
dH(D(Fn),D(G1)) + 1)/n > rn. Letting G′1 such that dH
(D(G1),D(G′1)) = 1 and taking
ρ = 1 in Lemma 7, we get that LS
(
T,D(G1)
) ≤ Cn,kΓU,n since
|α(G1)− α(G′1)|
≤
∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
∫
IF(x;α, (1− t)G1 + tG′1)d(G1 −G′1)dt
∣∣∣
≤ d∞(G1, G′1) sup
t∈[0,1]
γ(α, (1− t)G1 + tG′1)
≤ 1
n
sup
t∈[0,1]
sup
x
∣∣∣H ′k(n‖U((1− t)G1 + tG′1)‖2)2nU((1− t)G1 + tG′1)T IF(x;U, (1− t)G1 + tG′1)∣∣∣
≤ 2 sup
z>0
{H ′k(nz2)z} sup
t∈[0,1]
sup
x
‖IF(x;U, (1− t)G1 + tG′1)‖
≤ Cn,kΓU,n (24)
The last inequality used the definition of ΓU,n and supz>0{H ′k(nz2)z} = (k−1)
(k−1)/2e−(k−1)/2√
n2k/2Γ(k/2)
.
Therefore
e−ξdH(D(Fn),D(G1))LS
(
T,D(G1)
) ≤ Cn,kΓU,n exp (− ξnrn + ξ).
Suppose now that [dH(D(Fn),D(G1)) + 1]/n ≤ rn and fix D(G2) ∈ Rn×m such that
dH(D(G1),D(G2)) = 1. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n} be the index at which D(G1) and D(G2) differ.
Finally let D(G3) ∈ R(n−1)×m be the data set obtained by removing the jth element of
D(G1). Then by the triangle inequality
d∞(Fn, G3) ≤ d∞(Fn, G1) + d∞(G3, G1) ≤ [dH(D(Fn),D(G1) + 1]/n ≤ rn
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and hence γ1/n(γ,G3) ≤ Γ˜n. Therefore simple calculations show that
‖α(G1)− α(G2)‖ = ‖α(G1)− α(G3) + α(G3)− α(G2)‖
≤ 2
n
γ1/n(α,G3)
≤ 2Γ˜n
n
Since the bound holds for any choice of D(G2), we see that LS(T,D(G1)) ≤ 2Γ˜n/n and
consequently e−ξdH(D(Fn),D(G1))LS(T,D(G1)) ≤ 2Γ˜n/n .
Lemma 6. Assume Conditions 1–3. Then
Γ˜n ≤ 2γ(α, Fn) + C ′
√
m log(2/δ)
n
Knλmax(M
−1
Fn
)
{
1 + 2Ln/b+ λmax(M
−1
Fn
)(C1 + 2C2Kn/b)
}
.
Proof. We adapt the arguments developed for the estimation problem in Lemma 2. By
Lemma 15 we have that
γ1/n(α,G) ≤ 2γ(α,G)+O
[ 1
n
Knλmax(M
−1
F )
{
1+2Ln/b+λmax(M
−1
G )(C1 +2C2Kn/b)
}]
(25)
for all G ∈ {H : d∞(Fn, H) ≤ C
√
m log(2/δ)
n
}. Furthermore, it follows from Lemma 16 that
γ(α,G) ≤ γ(α, Fn)+O
[√m log(2/δ)
n
Knλmax(M
−1
Fn
)
{
1+Ln/b+λmax(M
−1
Fn
)(C1+2C2Kn/b)
}]
.
(26)
Using (26) in (25) shows the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Let’s first consider the Wald functional. The proof of the first claim is very similar
to that of Theorem 2. The main difference is that ‖U(Fn)‖ = OP (
√
k/n) and hence
γ(α, Fn) = sup
x
|2nH ′k(n‖U(Fn)‖2)U(Fn)T IF(x;U, Fn)|
≤ |2nH ′k(n‖U(Fn)‖2)|‖U(Fn)‖γ(U, Fn)
≤ |2nH ′k(n‖U(Fn)‖2)|‖U(Fn)‖‖V −1/2‖γ(T, Fn)
≤ OP (
√
nkKn).
For the second claim it suffices to notice that since 2 log(n)γ(α,Fn)
nε
Z ≤ OP
(
Kn log(n)√
n/kε
)
= oP (1),
a Taylor expansion of H−1k yields
Q(Fn) = H
−1
k (α(Fn) + oP (1)) = H
−1
k (α(Fn)) + oP (1) = Q0(Fn) + oP (1).
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It is easy to see that the proof for S˜ and is very similar. The same arguments also work for
the Rao test since direct calculations show that
IF(x;Z, Fn) =
( 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ψ˙(xi;TR(Fn))(2)
)
IF(x;TR, Fn) + Z(T, Fn −∆x).
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. First note that Proposition 1 yields lower bounds of the form ρ
16
γρ(α, F ) for our
problem. We will simply further lower bound γρ(α, F ) in order to establish the claimed
result. Writing ρn =
√
nρ = 1√
n
d log 2
2ε
e and Fρn,n = (1− 1√nρn)F + 1√n∆x for a fixed x, we see
that √
n(U(Fn)− U(Fρn,n))→d N(0, Ik).
Furthermore, let α(Fρn,n) = 1−Hk(q1−α0 ; t(ρn)), where t(ρn) = n‖U(Fρn,n)‖2 and let b(ρn) =
−Hk(q1−α0 ; t(ρn)). Following the computations of Proposition 4 in Heritier and Ronchetti
(1994) we have that
α(Fρn,x)− α(F ) = ρnb′(0) +
1
2
ρ2nb
′′(0) + o(ρ2n) +O(n
−1)
= ρ2nµ‖IF(x;U, F )‖2 + o(ρ2n) +O(n−1)
Using the last inequality we can see that
γρ(α, F ) = sup
x′
1
ρ
∣∣α((1− ρ)F + ∆x′)− α(F )∣∣
≥ 1
ρ
∣∣α((1− ρ)F + ∆x)− α(F )∣∣
=
1
ρ
∣∣ρ2nµ‖IF(x;U, F )‖2 + o(ρ2n) +O(n−1)∣∣
≥
⌈
log 2
2ε
⌉
µ‖IF(x;U, F )‖2 + o
(⌈
log 2
2ε
⌉)
.
Taking the supremum over x on the right hand side of the last expression completes the
proof.
Appendix B: properties of the influence function
The influence function is a particular case of the Gaˆteaux derivative which constitutes a
more general notion of differentiability. We say that a functional T : F → Θ is Gaˆteaux
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differentiable at F if there is a linear functional L = LF such that for all G ∈ F
lim
t→0
T (Ft)− T (F )
t
= LF (G− F )
with Ft = (1 − t)F + tG. In this section we derive some useful properties of the influence
function and the gross-error sensitivity that we use to establish our differential privacy guar-
antees. The next lemma states a useful identity for relating the gross-error sensitivity to its
fixed scale counterpart for M-estimators.
Lemma 7. Let Ft = (1− t)F + tG, then for ρ ∈ (0, 1] we have
T (Fρ)− T (F ) =
∫ ρ
0
∫
IF(x;T, Ft)d(G− F )dt.
Proof. We reproduce the arguments of Huber and Ronchetti (2009) p. 38-39 for complete-
ness. By construction
T (Fρ)− T (F0) =
∫ ρ
0
d
dt
T (Ft)dt,
where
d
dt
T (Ft) = lim
h→0
T (Ft+h)− T (Ft)
h
.
Noting that Ft+h can be rewritten as
Ft+h =
(
1− h
1− t
)
Ft +
h
1− tG
we get that
d
dt
T (Ft) =
1
1− t
∫
IF(x;T, Ft)d(G− Ft) =
∫
IF(x;T, Ft)d(G− F ).
Gross-error sensitivity bounds
The next lemmas provide a series of upper bounds relating γρ(T, F ), γ(T, Fρ) and γ(T,G),
where T is an M-functional defined by the equation∫
Ψ(x, T (F ))dF = 0.
The M-functional is assumed to satisfy supx ‖Ψ(x, θ)‖ ≤ K and the following smoothness
assumptions guaranteed by Condition 3 in the main text.. There exist r1 > 0, r2 > 0, C1
and C2 > 0 such that
‖EF [Ψ˙(X, θ)]− EG[Ψ˙(X, θ)]‖ ≤ C1d∞(F,G) and
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‖EG[Ψ˙(X, θ)]− EG[Ψ˙(X,T (G))]‖ ≤ C2‖T (G)− θ‖
whenever d∞(F,G) ≤ r1 and ‖θ−T (G)‖ ≤ r2. We will further assume that λmin(MG) ≥ b > 0
for all G.
Lemma 8. Let T be an M-functional defined by a bounded function Ψ and such that
MF = M(T, F ) is positive definite. Then, for ρ ∈ (0, 1] we have that
γρ(T, F ) ≤ 2 sup
t∈[0,ρ]
γ(T, Ft),
where Ft = (1− t)F + t∆x.
Proof. Lemma 7 and direct calculations show that
γρ(T, F ) = sup
x
∥∥∥∥ρ−1 ∫ ρ
0
∫
IF(x;T, Ft)d(∆x − F )dt
∥∥∥∥
≤ sup
x
‖ρ−1
∫ ρ
0
M−1Ft Ψ(x, T (Ft))dt‖+
∥∥∥∥ρ−1 ∫ ρ
0
(∫
M−1Ft Ψ(y, T (Ft))dF (z)
)
dt
∥∥∥∥
≤ sup
t∈[0,ρ]
sup
x
‖M−1Ft Ψ(x, T (Ft))‖+ sup
t∈[0,ρ]
∥∥∥∥∫ M−1Ft Ψ(x, T (Ft))dF (z)∥∥∥∥
≤2γ(T, Fρ).
Lemma 9. Under the assumptions of Lemma 8, if sup ‖Ψ˙(x, θ)‖ ≤ L for all θ ∈ Θ and
λmax(M
−1
F )ρ{C1 + 2C2K/b} < 1, we have that
γ(T, Fρ) ≤γ(T, F ) + ρKλmax(M−1F )
{
2L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+O
[
ρ2K(C1 + 2C2K/b)
{
C1 + (K + L)C2K/b
}]
Proof. Simple manipulations and a first order (integral form) Taylor expansion shows that
IF(x;T, Fρ)− IF(x;T, F )
= M−1Fρ Ψ(x, T (Fρ))−M−1F Ψ(x, T (F ))
= M−1F {Ψ(x, T (Fρ))−Ψ(x, T (F ))}+ (M−1Fρ −M−1F )Ψ(x, T (Fρ))
= M−1F M˜∆x{T (Fρ)− T (F )}+ (M−1Fρ −M−1F )[Ψ(x, T (F )) + M˜∆x{T (Fρ)− T (F )}], (27)
where M˜∆x =
∫ 1
0
Ψ˙[x, T (F ) + t{T (Fρ)− T (F )}]dt. Therefore
‖IF(x;T, Fρ)‖ ≤‖IF(x;T, F )‖+ ‖M−1F M˜∆x{T (Fρ)− T (F )}‖
+ ‖(M−1Fρ −M−1F )Ψ(x, T (F )) + M˜∆x{T (Fρ)− T (F )}‖
≤γ(T, F ) + Lλmax(M−1F )‖T (Fρ)− T (F )‖
+ ‖M−1Fρ −M−1F ‖(K + L‖T (Fρ)− T (F )‖). (28)
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Furthermore, using Neumann series we have that
M−1Fρ = M
−1
F −M−1F (MFρ −MF )M−1F +
∑
k≥2
(
−M−1F (MFρ −MF )
)j
M−1F . (29)
and by Condition 3 and Lemma 8
‖MFρ −MF‖
=
∥∥∥∥EFρ [Ψ˙(X,T (Fρ))− Ψ˙(X,T (F ))] + EFρ [Ψ˙(X,T (F ))]− EF [Ψ˙(X,T (F ))]∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥EFρ [Ψ˙(X,T (F ))]− EF [Ψ˙(X,T (F ))]∥∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥∥EFρ [Ψ˙(X,T (Fρ))− Ψ˙(X,T (F ))]∥∥∥∥
≤ C1d∞(Fρ, F ) + C2‖T (Fρ)− T (F )‖
≤ ρ{C1 + C2γρ(T, F )}
≤ ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b). (30)
Since ‖M−1F ‖‖MFρ −MF )‖ ≤ λmax(M−1F )ρ{C1 + 2C2K/b} < 1 we also have∥∥∥∑
k≥2
(
−M−1F (MFρ −MF )
)j
M−1F
∥∥∥ ≤‖M−1F ‖∑
k≥2
‖M−1F ‖j‖MFρ −MF )‖j
≤‖M−1F ‖
(
1
1− ‖M−1F ‖‖MFρ −MF )‖
− 1− ‖M−1F ‖‖MFρ −MF )‖
)
≤ ‖M
−1
F ‖3‖MFρ −MF )‖2
1− ‖M−1F ‖‖MFρ −MF )‖
≤ ρ
2(C1 + 2C2K/b)
2λ3max(M
−1
F )
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
(31)
Therefore using Lemma 7, (29)–(31) and taking the supremum over (28), we obtain
γ(T, Fρ)
≤ γ(T, F ) + Lλmax(M−1F )(2ρK/b)
+
{
λ2max(M
−1
F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b) +
ρ2(C1 + 2C2K/b)
2λ3max(M
−1
F )
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
(K + 2ρLK/b)
= γ(T, F ) + ρKλmax(M
−1
F )
{
2L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+ ρ2Kλ2max(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
{
2L/b+
λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+ 2ρ3b−1KL
λ3max(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
2
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
(32)
The desired result follows from (32).
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Lemma 10. Under the assumptions of Lemma 9 we have that
γρ(T, F ) ≤ 2γ(T, F ) + 2ρKλmax(M−1F )
{
2L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+O
[
ρ2K(C1 + 2C2K/b)
{
C1 + (K + L)C2K/b
}]
.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemmas 8 and 9.
Lemma 11. Assume the conditions of Lemma 10 and let d∞(F,G) ≤ ρ. Then we have that
γ(T,G) ≤γ(T, F ) + ρKλmax(M−1F )
{
2L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+O
[
ρ2K(C1 + 2C2K/b)
{
C1 + (K + L)C2/b
}]
.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 9. First note that
IF(x;T,G)− IF(x;T, F )
= M−1G Ψ(x, T (G))−M−1F Ψ(x, T (F ))
= M−1F {Ψ(x, T (G))−Ψ(x, T (F ))}+ (M−1G −M−1F )Ψ(x, T (G))
= M−1F M˜{T (G)− T (F )}+ (M−1G −M−1F )[Ψ(x, T (F )) + M˜{T (G)− T (F )}], (33)
where M˜ =
∫ 1
0
Ψ˙[x, T (F ) + t{T (G)− T (F )}]dt. Further note that
M−1G = M
−1
F −M−1F (MG −MF )M−1F +
∑
k≥2
(
−M−1F (MG −MF )
)j
M−1F . (34)
and that applying Lemma 7 with ρ = 1 we have that
‖T (G)− T (F )‖ ≤
∥∥∥∫ 1
0
∫
IF(x;T, Ft)d(G− F )dt
∥∥∥
≤d∞(F,G) sup
t∈[0,1]
γ(T, (1− t)F + tG)
≤ρK
b
(35)
Therefore, by Condition 3
‖MG −MF‖ =
∥∥∥∥EG[Ψ˙(X,T (G))− Ψ˙(X,T (F ))] + EG[Ψ˙(X,T (F ))]− EF [Ψ˙(X,T (F ))]∥∥∥∥
≤ C2‖T (G)− T (F )‖+ C1d∞(G,F )
≤ ρ(C1 + C2K/b) (36)
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where the second inequality used Lemma 7 with t = 1. Furthermore, adapting (31) we see
that
‖
∑
k≥2
(
−M−1F (MG −MF )
)j
M−1F ‖ ≤
ρ2(C1 + 2C2K/b)
2λ3max(M
−1
F )
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
(37)
Combining (33)–(37) we see that
‖IF(x;T,G)‖
≤ ‖IF(x;T, F )‖+ ‖M−1F M˜{T (G)− T (F )}‖+ ‖(M−1G −M−1F )[Ψ(x, T (F )) + M˜{T (G)− T (F )}‖
≤ ‖IF(x;T, F )‖+ Lλmax(M−1F )ρK/b+ ‖M−1G −M−1F ‖(K + LρK/b)
≤ γ(T, F ) + ρLλmin(MF )−1K/b
+
(
λ2max(M
−1
F )ρ(C1 + C2K/b) +
ρ2(C1 + C2K/b)
2λ3max(M
−1
F )
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + C2K/b)
){
K + LρK/b
}
≤ γ(T, F ) + ρλmin(MF )−1K
{
L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + C2K/b)
}
+ ρ2Kλ2max(M
−1
F )(C1 + C2K/b)
{
L/b+
λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + C2K/b)
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+ ρ3b−1KL
λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + C2K/b)
2
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
(38)
Therefore taking the supremum over (38) we obtain the desired result
Generalized gross-error sensitivity bounds
We now provide a series of bounds on the gross-error sensitivity of a general functional g
that we use to study the three test functionals W , R and S˜ described in Section 4.1. Our
results rely on the following assumptions on g.
Condition 4. The function g : Rp × F → R has two continuous partial derivatives with
respect to its two arguments. Furthermore its first and second order partial derivatives
with respect to the corresponding two arguments ∇1g, ∇2g ∇11g ,∇12g, ∇21g and ∇22g are
bounded in sup norm by some constant C¯.
Lemma 12 shows that, under usual regularity conditions, the test functionals W , R and
S˜ satisfy Condition 4. Lemmas 13–16 provide inequalities relating different gross-error-
sensitivity functions of h(F ) = g(T (F ), F ), namely γ(h, F ), γ(h, Fρ), γρ(h, F ) and γ(h,G).
These results are in the spirit of Lemmas 8–11.
Lemma 12. The test functionals W (F ), R(F ) and S˜(F ) can be written as g(T (F ), F ). If in
addition Condition 1 holds with Kn = K <∞ and Ln = L <∞, then g satisfies Condition
4.
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Proof. We verify the claims separately for W (F ), R(F ) and S˜(F ) in the three points below.
1. Wald functional: it is immediate from the definition of W that in fact W (F ) = f ◦
T (F ) = g(T (F ), F ), where f : θ → θT(2)(V (T, F )22)−1θ(2). Therefore g is constant
function of the second argument and ∇2g = 0, ∇21g = 0 and ∇22g = 0. Furthermore
g is quadratic in its second argument and ∇1g(T (F ), F ) = (0T , 2θT(2)(V (T, F )22)−1)T
and ∇11g(T (F ), F ) = blockdiag{0, 2(V (T, F )22)−1}.
2. Rao functional: sinceR is quadratic in the functional Z(T, F ) =
∫
Ψ(X,TR(F ))(2)dF =
f(TR(F ), F ), we have that R(F ) = g(TR(F ), F ). Hence in order to check Condition 4
it suffices to see that the derivatives of f are bounded because
∇1f(TR(F ), F ) =
∫
Ψ˙(X,TR(F ))(2)dF, ∇2f(TR(F ), F ) = Ψ(X,TR(F ))(2)
∇11f(TR(F ), F ) =
∫
∂
∂θ
Ψ˙(X, θ)(2)dF
∣∣∣
θ=TR(F )
, ∇12f(TR(F ), F ) = Ψ˙(X,TR(F ))(2)
and
∇22f(TR(F ), F ) = 0.
3. Likelihood ratio-type functional: since S˜(F ) is quadratic in T (F )(2), the arguments
given for W apply.
Lemma 13. Under the assumptions of Lemma 8 and h(F ) = g(T (F ), F ), we have that
γρ(h, F ) ≤ 2 sup
t∈[0,ρ]
γ(h, Ft),
where Ft = (1− t)F + t∆x.
Proof. Since Lemma 7 applies to h(Fρ) − h(F ), the same arguments used in the proof of
Lemma 8 show the claimed result.
Lemma 14. Under the assumptions of Lemma 9 and h(F ) = g(T (F ), F ), we have that
γ(h, Fρ) ≤ γ(h, F ) +O
[
ρK
{
L/b+ (C1 + 2C2K/b)
}]
.
Proof. First note that
IF(x;h, F ) = ∇1g(T (F ), F )IF(x;T, F ) +∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )
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and
IF(x;h, Fρ)− IF(x;h, F )
=
{
∇1g(T (Fρ), Fρ)IF(x;T, Fρ)−∇1g(T (F ), F )IF(x;T, F )
}
+
{
∇2g(T (Fρ), Fρ)(∆x − Fρ)−∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )
}
= I1 + I2. (39)
We will proceed to bound |I1| and |I2| separately since from (39) we see that
|IF(x;h, Fρ)| ≤ |IF(x;h, F )|+ |I1|+ |I2|.
Let us first focus on I2. Note that
I2 = (1− ρ)∇2g(T (Fρ), Fρ)(∆x − F )−∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )
= (1− ρ)
{
∇2g(T (Fρ), Fρ)(∆x − F )−∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )
}
− ρ∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )
(40)
and that ∇2g(θ, F )(∆x−F ) can be viewed as a function g2 : Θ×F → R. Therefore viewing
g2 as a function of the first argument allows us to get a first order Taylor expansion of the
form
g2(θ, F ) = g2(θ
′, F ) +
[ ∫ 1
0
∇1g2{θ′ + t(θ − θ′), F}dt
]
(θ − θ′) = g2(θ′, F ) + (∇1g¯2)(θ − θ′),
while viewing g2 as function of its second argument leads to
g2(θ, Fρ) = g2(θ, F ) +
∫ ρ
0
d
dt
g2(θ, Ft)dt = g2(θ, F ) +
∫ ρ
0
∇2g2(θ, Ft)(∆x − F )dt.
Applying consecutively the above expressions in the identity (40) yields
I2 =(1− ρ)
{
∇2g(T (F ), Fρ)(∆x − F )−∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F ) + (∇1g¯2)
(
T (Fρ)− T (F )
)}
− ρ∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )
=(1− ρ)
{∫ ρ
0
∇2g2(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )dt+ (∇1g¯2)
(
T (Fρ)− T (F )
)}− ρ∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F )
=(1− ρ)
{∫ ρ
0
∇2g2(T (F ), Ft)(∆x − F )dt+ ρ(∇1g¯2)IFρ(x;T, F )
}
− ρ∇2g(T (F ), F )(∆x − F ).
(41)
Since Condition 4 guarantees that all the first two partial derivatives of g are bounded, from
(41) and the triangle inequality we see that
|I2| = O
[
ρ
{
1 + γρ(T, F )
}]
(42)
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Let us now study I1. Note that ∇1g(θ, F ) can be viewed as a function g1 : Θ×F → Rp and
admits analogous expansions to the ones considered for g2 in (41). Therefore
I1 = ∇1g(T (F ), F )
{
IF(x, T, Fρ)− IF(x;T, F )
}
+
{
∇1g(T (Fρ), Fρ)−∇1g(T (F ), F )
}
IF(x;T, Fρ)
= ∇1g(T (F ), F )
{
IF(x, T, Fρ)− IF(x;T, F )
}
+
{
∇1g(T (F ), Fρ)−∇1g(T (F ), F ) + (∇2g¯1)
(
T (Fρ)− T (F )
)}
IF(x;T, Fρ)
= ∇1g(T (F ), F )
{
IF(x, T, Fρ)− IF(x;T, F )
}
+
{∫ ρ
0
∇1g1(T (F ), Ft)(∆x − F )dt+ ρ(∇2g¯1)IFρ(x;T, F )
}
IF(x;T, Fρ). (43)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, (43) and (27)–(30) we see that
|I1| ≤ ‖∇1g(T (F ), F )‖‖IF(x;T, Fρ)− IF(x;T, F )‖
+
∥∥∥∫ ρ
0
∇1g1(T (F ), Ft)(∆x − F )dt
∥∥∥‖IF(x;T, F )‖+ ρ‖∇2g¯1‖‖IF(x;T, F )‖‖IFρ(x;T, F )‖
≤ C¯
{
‖IF(x;T, Fρ)− IF(x;T, F )‖+ ργ(T, F ) + ργρ(T, F )γ(T, F )
}
≤ C¯
{∥∥∥(M−1Fρ −M−1F )[Ψ(x, T (F )) + M˜∆x{T (Fρ)− T (F )}] +M−1F M˜∆x{T (Fρ)− T (F )}∥∥∥
+ ρ
(
1 + γρ(T, F )
)
γ(T, F )
}
≤ C¯
[
λmax(MF )
{ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
λmin(MF )2
+
ρ2(C1 + 2C2K/b)
2λ2max(M
−1
F )
λmax(M
−1
F )− ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
(K + 2ρLK/b)
+ Lλmax(M
−1
F )(2ρK/b) + ρLλmin(MF )
−1γρ(T, F ) + ρ
(
1 + γρ(T, F )
)
γ(T, F )
]
≤ C¯
[
ρKλmax(M
−1
F )
{
2L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+ ρ2Kλ2max(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
{
2L/b+
λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}
+ 2ρ3b−1KL
λ3max(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
2
1− λmax(M−1F )ρ(C1 + 2C2K/b)
+ ρ
(
1 + 2ρK/b
)
λmax(M
−1
F )K
]
(44)
Using Lemma 10 to further upper bound (42) and (44) and taking the supremum over the
left hand side term of the resulting inequalities yields the desired result.
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Lemma 15. Under the assumptions of Lemma 10 we have that
γρ(g, F ) ≤ 2γ(g, F ) +O
[
ρKλmax(M
−1
F )
{
1 + 2L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}]
.
Proof. The result is immediate from Lemmas 13 and 14.
Lemma 16. Under the assumptions of Lemma 11 we have that
γ(g,G) ≤ γ(g, F ) +O
[
ρKλmax(M
−1
F )
{
1 + L/b+ λmax(M
−1
F )(C1 + 2C2K/b)
}]
.
Proof. The proof is similar that of Lemma 14 and is omitted for the sake of space.
Appendix C: variance sensitivity of test statistics
In this appendix we detail the consequences of estimating the standardizing matricesM(T, F ),
U(T, F ) and V (T, F ) on our construction. For this we need the change of variance function
as a complementary tool to the influence function for the analysis of the sensitivity of the
test functionals.
The change of variance function of M-estimators
The change of variance function of an M-functional T at the model distribution F is defined
as
CVF(x;T, F ) :=
∂
∂t
V (T, (1− t)F + t∆x)
∣∣∣
t=0
for all x where this expression exists; see Hampel et al. (1981) and Hampel et al. (1986). It
is essentially the influence function of the asymptotic variance functional V (T, F ). It reflects
the impact of small amounts of contamination on the variance of the estimator T (Fn) and
hence on the length of the confidence intervals. We reproduce below the form of the change
of variance functions for general M-estimators as derived in Zhelonkin (2013).
For the sake of simplicity, we write V = V (T, F ), Ψ = Ψ(x, T (F )) =
(
Ψ1 Ψ2 . . . Ψp
)T
and
∂Ψ
∂θ
=

∂Ψ1
∂θ1
∂Ψ1
∂θ2
. . . ∂Ψ1
∂θp
∂Ψ2
∂θ1
∂Ψ2
∂θ2
. . . ∂Ψ2
∂θp
...
...
. . .
...
∂Ψp
∂θ1
∂Ψp
∂θ2
. . . ∂Ψp
∂θp

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Using this notation, the change of variance function of M-estimators is
CVF(x;T, F ) = V−M−1
(∫
DdF +
∂
∂θ
Ψ
)
V − V
(∫
DdF +
∂
∂θ
Ψ
)
M−1
+M−1
(∫
RdF +
∫
RTdF + ΨΨT
)
M−1
where
D =
{( ∂
∂θ
∂
∂θj
Ψk
)T
IF(x;T, F )
}p
j,k=1
and
R =
( ∂
∂θ
Ψ
)
IF(x;T, F )ΨT .
Change of variance sensitivity for tests
The following result shows how the influence function of standardized M-functionals depends
on both the influence function and the change of variance function of its corresponding
unstandardized M-functional.
Proposition 2. Let T (F ) be an M-functional, with associated asymptotic variance matrix
V (T, F ). Then the influence function of the standardized functional U(F ) = V (T, F )−1/2T (F )
has the form
IF(x;U, F ) = V (T, F )−1/2IF(x;T, F )− 1
2
V (T, F )−1/2CVF(x;T, F )V (T, F )−1T (F ). (45)
Proof. The result follows by applying the chain rule to the derivative of U(Ft) with respect
to t with Ft = (1 − t)F + t∆x and evaluating the resulting expression at t = 0. Indeed the
derivative of V (T, Ft) is CVF(x;T, F ), the derivative of T (Ft) is IF(x;T, F ) and dA
−1/2(H) =
−1
2
A−1/2HA−1 for some symmetric p dimensional matrix A and H ∈ Rp×p
One can use Proposition 2 to get an upper bound of the gross-error sensitivity of the
differentially private Wald test resulting for the construction of Section 4. Note that if the
change of variance function is bounded it suffices to use the simpler bound based only on the
influence function of T as described in the main text. Assuming that Ψ˙ and its derivatives
are bounded, it suffices to multiply the first term of (45) by log(n) in order to guarantee a
bound on the smooth sensitivity. This can be shown by extending the arguments developed
in Appendix B. The same type of expansions work using the more complicated influence
function (45) at the expense of more tedious calculations. We could obtain results similar
to Proposition 2 for the standardized functionals used in the score and likelihood ratio tests.
However, as long as Ψ˙ and its derivatives are bounded, the simple bound discussed in the
main paper suffices to yield differential privacy.
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Appendix D: Further discussions and simulations
D.1 Competing methods
Let us begin by making some general remarks regarding differential privacy in practical
settings. We note that published work in the area usually have numerical illustrations with
samples sizes of the order of ∼ 100′000 for their methods to yield acceptable results; see
for example (Lei, 2011; Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Sheffet, 2017; Barrientos et al., 2019) among
many others. It transpires from the existing literature that differential privacy is perceived
as a very strong requirement that leads to very conservative analysis. As such, it also needs
large sample sizes in order to give meaningful statistical results. This has sometimes been
mentioned explicitly in different contexts (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008; Hall et al., 2012;
Abadi et al., 2016) and is usually reflected in the very large sample sizes used in examples
or implicitly by assuming that the variables of interest are bounded. The latter is used
in the computation of the sensitivity of the statistics being queried. One of the messages
of our paper is that if we want to enforce differential privacy constraints on non robust
estimators, this will inevitably require us to inject large amounts of noise to the analysis.
However, estimators that are robust by construction will require less noise in order to ensure
differential privacy. It is precisely because of this that our methods can outperform existing
alternatives that rely on truncation strategies or apply bounds that assume that the variables
are bounded.
In the context of linear regression, there are a number of existing methods that can achieve
differential privacy. One is tempted to take an off the shelve method that works for general
empirical risk minimization problems based on either objective function perturbations or
stochastic gradient descent algorithms e.g. ()chaudhurietal2011, bassilyetal2014. However
such methods typically require some Lipschitz constant that is unknown in practice which
makes the tuning of such algorithms tricky. There are a couple of estimation methods
tailored specifically for the linear regression framework. In particular Sheffet (2019) uses
random projections and compression via the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform in order to
achieve differential privacy. We do not include this estimator in our simulations since the
reported results in Appendix E of that paper require very large sample sizes. We restrict
our comparisons to the estimator that Cai et al. (2019) introduced for the linear regression
model as it was shown to be minimax optimal and it exhibited good numerical performance.
We note that there are less alternatives for hypothesis testing in the linear model context.
Only the work of Sheffet (2017) and Barrientos et al. (2019) seem to directly target this
issue. However, in both cases their algorithms require some delicate tuning for the respective
21
random projection/compression step for the former and for the subsampling and truncation
steps for the latter. More importantly, both methods seem to require sample sizes of the
order ∼ 10′000− 100′000 to give satisfactory statistical results.
D.2 Simulations
We consider the following six simulation settings for the linear regression model in order
to better illustrate the behavior of our method and compare it with the minimax optimal
estimator of Cai et al. (2019).
(a) The covariates are iid Bernoulli random variables with mean pi = 0.15, the variance of
the Gaussian error is 0.25 and all the slope parameters are set to β1 = · · · = β5 = 1. A
similar setting was considered in Cai et al. (2019).
(b) The covariates are iid standard normal, β = (0.5,−0.25, 0)T and σ = 1− 0.52− 0.255 as
considered in the simulated example of Sheffet (2017).
(c) The same normal linear regression model considered in Section 5.1 in the main document.
(d) Same as model (c) but with heavy tailed errors generated from a t-distribution with 4
degrees of freedom.
(e) Same as model (c) but with heavy tailed errors and covariates generated from a t-
distribution with 4 degrees of freedom.
(f) The contaminated linear regression model considered in Section 5.1.
Figure 4 reports the mean L2 error ‖β̂ − β‖/‖β‖ obtained over 100 simulations with
samples sizes ranging from n = 500 to n = 5000 for the six settings described above. We
report the classic non private maximum likelihood estimator, the robust estimator used in
Section 5.1 as well as the truncated estimator of Cai et al. (2019). The latter is essentially
a least squares estimator for truncated responses that is rendered differentially private with
the Gaussian mechanism. The level of truncation of the responses diverges as Kσ
√
log n for
some K > 0 and hence requires knowledge of the noise level σ. We note that our proposal
also matches the derived optimal minimax rates of convergence up to a logarithmic term. As
our simulations indicate, robust differentially private estimators can significantly outperform
the behavior of the truncated least squares estimator of Cai et al. (2019) especially in the
presence of heavy tails in the covariates. In this case the truncated estimator can be expected
to perform poorly since it was constructed under the assumption that the covariates are
bounded.
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Figure 4: Figures (a)–(d) show the performance of the MLE, the differentially private truncated
least squares estimator and the differentially private Mallows estimator.
D.3 Assessing technical constants
The privacy guarantees of Theorem 1 requires that n ≥ max{N0, N1, N2}, where N1 ≥
1
C2m log(2/δ)
[
1+4
ε
{p+2 log(2/δ)} log (λmax(MFn )
b
)]2
andN2 ≥ (C ′)2m log(2/δ)
{
2Ln/b+λ
−1
min(MFn)(C1+
C2
Kn
b
)
}2
, for some constants C and C ′ defined in (16) and Lemma 2. Consequently, a user
that wishes to check these conditions for a given data set and an M-estimator defined by
Ψ needs to know the value of the constants (C1, C2, N0, b, C, C
′). Let us therefore focus on
the evaluation of these constants. For concreteness and simplicity we focus on the robust
regression with Tukey biweight loss function as it admits three continuous derivatives almost
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everywhere. More precisely we consider
ρc(t) =
1− (1− (t/c)2)3 for |t| ≤ c1 for |t| > c
and
β̂ = argmin
β
n∑
i=1
ρc
(yi + xTi β
σ
)
w(xi), (46)
where σ is some known scale estimate and we can chose c = 4.685 for 95% efficiency at the
normal model when w(x) = 1. For this loss function we have
ρ′c(t) =
6t
c2
(
1− t
2
c2
)2
I|t|≤c, , ρ′′c (t) =
6
c2
(
1− t
2
c2
)(
1− 3t
2
c2
)
I|t|≤c, ρ′′′c (t) =
(12t3
c6
− 36t
c4
)
I|t|≤c,
Let’s first consider C1 and C2. Similar to Kn and Ln in Condition 1, their values are direct
consequences of the choice of Ψ. Indeed, one can take C1 = Ln since
‖EFn−Gn [Ψ˙(z, β)]‖ ≤ Ln‖Fn −Gn‖2 ≤ Lnd∞(Fn, Gn).
Furthermore, one can take C2 = maxt ρ
′′′(t)λmax( 1nX
TX)‖ supxw(x)x‖ since for some inter-
mediate points β¯(i) such that xTi β¯
(i) lies between xTi β̂ and x
T
i β, we have that
‖EFn [Ψ˙(x, y, β̂)− Ψ˙(x, y, β)]‖ =
∥∥∥ 1
n
n∑
i=1
xix
T
i w(xi)ρ
′′′
c (yi − xTi β¯(i))xTi (β̂ − β)
∥∥∥
≤ max
t
|ρ′′′c (t)|λmax
( 1
n
XTX
)
‖ max
1≤i≤n
w(xi)xi‖‖β̂ − β‖
The minimum sample size N0 defined in Condition 2 is related to the unknown minimum
eigenvalue b that cannot be computed in general for M-estimators. A simple remedy of this
issue is to incorporate a ridge penalty with a vanishing tuning parameter τn guaranteeing
that λmin(MGn) ≥ τn for all n and all empirical distributions Gn, hence also implying N0 = n.
More specifically, choosing τn = 1/n one would minimize
β̂ = argmin
β
{ n∑
i=1
ρc
(yi + xTi β
σ
)
w(xi) +
1
2n
‖β‖2
}
.
This ridge penalty would guarantee that b ≥ 1
n
and can be used in order to evaluate N1
since the term log(nλmax(MFn)) will remain small relative to n. This approach would not
lead to a meaningful way to evaluate N2 and at first glance seems to suggest the sample size
condition n ≥ N2 might be hard to meet. We note however while the term b in N1 comes
from a worst case consideration over all empirical distributions in (17), the term b in N2
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was computed over all distributions G such that d∞(Fn, G) ≤ C
√
m log(2/δ)
n
. Consequently
one should think of b in N2 as a constant that is not too different from λmin(MFn). A non
completely rigorous, but practical solution is to replace C2Kn/b by 2C2λmax(M
−1
Fn
)Kn in the
inequality defining N2. Indeed, the von Mises expansion (1) leads to
‖T (G)− T (Fn)‖ ≤ ρλmax(M−1Fn )Kn + o(ρ)
and
‖MG −MFn‖ ≤ ρ(C1 + C2λmax(M−1Fn )Kn) + o(ρ)
instead of ‖T (G)− T (Fn)‖ ≤ ρKn/b and ‖MG −MFn‖ ≤ ρ(C1 + C2Kn/b) in (35) and (36).
The constant C > 0 is arbitrary in Lemma 1, but it should not be too small in order to
meet the requirement n ≥ N1. Similarly, C ′ > 0 should be large in Lemma 2 but not too
large in practice in order to guarantee that n ≥ N2. A closer inspection of the arguments
used in proof of Lemma 2 shows that the choice of C ′ comes from (32) and (38), and could be
chosen to be 2C, and one could take C = 1/
√
m log(2/δ) in order to simplify the expressions
of N1 and N2. A much more conservative choice of C would be pick a large constant that
gives (16) the interpreation of leading to a usual Borel-Cantelli neighborhood around F .
We note that Theorem 4 also involves some constants CU and Cn,k,U . The former is
an upper bound on the test functional used and from the arguments of Lemma 12 we
get that it is 2λmax(V (T, F )22)
−1 for the Wald functional, CU = 2λmax((T, F )22.1) for the
Likelihood ratio type functional and CU = max{Ln, L′n} for the Rao functional, where
Ln = supx max1≤j≤p ‖ ∂2∂θ∂θT Ψj(x; θ)‖ and Ψj is the jth component of Ψ. On the other hand
Cn,k,U =
nCn,kΓU
γ(α,Fn)
where γ(α,Fn)
n
= 2H ′k(n‖Un‖2)|UTn IF(x;U, Fn)|, and Cn,k and ΓU are defined
in Lemma 5. Note that ΓU can be evaluated using (35) to get the bound ‖T (Gn)−T (G′n)‖ ≤
Kn
bn
for any Gn, G
′
n such that dH(Gn, G
′
n) = 1. Therefore ΓU ≤ λmax(V (T, F )22)−1/2)Knbn for
the Wald functional, ΓU ≤ λmax(M(T, F )22.1)1/2)Knbn for the likelihood ratio type functional
and ΓU ≤ λmax(U(T, F ))KnLnbn for the Rao functional.
Finally, we note that in the more realistic case where σ is unknown, one could either use
a preliminary scale estimate in (46) or estimate it conconmitantly with β by solving a system
of equations similar to the one considered in Example 1. In both cases the formula of the
influence function of T (Fn) = β̂ becomes slightly more involved as they will now depend on
the influence function of S(Fn) = σ̂ (Huber and Ronchetti, 2009, Ch. 6.4). Consequently
the assessments of the constants (C1, C2, N0, b, C, C
′) discussed above would also need to be
adapted for the estimation of σ. We leave for future research the important issue of providing
a systematic treatment of evaluating such constants for wider class of M-estimators. Not only
would it render the privacy guarantees of our proposals easier to assess, it might also give
25
some further insights into which classes of robust M-estimators could be more convenient for
differential privacy.
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